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Notes
Dropping the Other Shoe: Personal Jurisdiction and
Remote Technology in the Post-Pandemic World
JENNY BAGGER†
As the question of how new technology factors into the personal jurisdiction analysis remains
unresolved, the vast increase in the reliance on remote technology that the COVID-19 pandemic
spurred urges a definitive answer. Even when the pandemic comes to its end, the shift it caused
towards remote interactions and the question of how these interactions affect personal
jurisdiction will continue as society enters the post-pandemic world. The now-outdated Internetspecific test that lower courts created more than twenty years ago has caused more confusion
than clarity and no longer suits the technology of a rapidly evolving society. As the new norm,
remote interactions and virtual contacts can fit within the traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrines on the same—even surer—footing as physical contacts.
This Note argues that virtual contacts should support a finding of personal jurisdiction and offers
a solution that uses the familiar tools from International Shoe and its progeny to analyze
technology-based connections in the post-pandemic world and beyond. Through three
approaches, this Note posits a more coherent doctrine that combines its traditions with the
realities of an ever-evolving society and provides an answer as courts, commentators, and civil
procedure enthusiasts wait for the Internet-jurisdiction shoe to drop.1

† J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Articles Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to Professor Scott Dodson, whose guidance, expertise, and insights into this
Note were invaluable. Thank you also to the editors of Hastings Law Journal for their hard work, dedication,
and thoughtful edits. Thank you finally to my family for their endless support and encouragement and to Thad
Jameson for everything.
1. See Wait for the Other Shoe to Drop, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/wait-forthe-other-shoe-to-drop (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) (“Await a seemingly inevitable event . . . .”).
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an Illinois company with its principal place of business in Illinois
wishes to gain insight on its upcoming business ventures. As part of this goal,
the company hires two consultants from Connecticut to work on separate
projects but has no other contacts with the state. One consultant is quite
comfortable with technology and so can work completely remotely. All of the
company’s contacts with him—communications, documents and video sharing,
and the like—are virtual. The other consultant prefers to work in person, so she
often flies to Illinois to visit with the company face-to-face, while the company
mails physical documents to her in Connecticut and, occasionally, sends
company representatives to participate in in-person meetings at the consultant’s
Connecticut office. Ultimately, however, the business ventures fall through, and
the company fails to pay either consultant for work on either project. Both
consultants sue the company for breach of contract in their home state of
Connecticut. The second consultant likely can do so because the company
routinely had physical contacts with Connecticut in connection with her project,
so the courts in Connecticut will likely have personal jurisdiction over the
company. But the first consultant may have a more difficult time suing the
company in Connecticut, even for similar work and for a similar harm, because
the company’s contacts with Connecticut in his case were all virtual.2 Courts in
Connecticut may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the company based on the
company’s use of technology to connect with its remote worker,3 a practice that

2. This hypothetical is loosely based on Callahan v. Wisdom, No. 3:19-CV-00350, 2020 WL 2061882
(D. Conn. Apr. 29, 2020), which dealt with only one consultant—the remote worker. Comparing the remote
worker’s difficulty establishing personal jurisdiction with a hypothetical in-person worker highlights the
unfairness of lower courts’ tendency to treat differently similar plaintiffs with similar contacts and similar harms,
where the only difference is the virtual or physical nature of the contacts. This comparison reveals that, currently,
courts do not view virtual contacts on the same footing as physical contacts. This Note argues that they should.
The court in Callahan concluded that “the evidence fails to demonstrate that the Company purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Connecticut such that it might reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in Connecticut merely by engaging a consultant, who, purely incidental to his work for
the Company, was located in Connecticut.” Callahan, 2020 WL 2061882, at *12. However, the company’s
engagement with the remote worker in his home state was not necessarily “purely incidental.” Rather, as this
illustration shows, the virtual contacts a company shares with its worker in his home state can be just as
meaningful as physical contacts and can be sufficient for exercising jurisdiction.
3. Several recent lower court cases illustrate this misguided approach that some courts have taken to
personal jurisdiction based on remote work. See, e.g., Callahan, 2020 WL 2061882, at *12; Picot v. Weston,
780 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2015); Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 647, 654
(E.D.N.C. 2018), aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019); TorcUP, Inc. v. Aztec Bolting Servs., Inc., 386 F. Supp.
3d 520, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2019); Pederson v. Frost, 951 F.3d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 2020); Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders of U.S., No. CV TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 5759766, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020); Gonzalez v.
U.S. Hum. Rts. Network, 512 F. Supp. 3d 944, 958–59 (D. Ariz. 2021).
By contrast, other courts have found that defendant employers’ virtual contacts with their remote
employees were sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction, each demonstrating a plausible way out of the virtual
contacts tangle. See, e.g., Williams v. Preeminent Protective Servs., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 265, 273 (E.D.N.Y.
2015); Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *3–12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016);
Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); Ouellette v. True Penny People,
LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 144, 155 (D. Mass. 2018); Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC, 359 F. Supp. 3d 499, 513 (E.D.
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is becoming increasingly prevalent in an advancing society and one that has seen
the myriad effects of a pandemic. This dissonance between cases with
substantially similar harms and conduct but different jurisdictional outcomes
poses real concerns regarding advancing fundamental fairness and maintaining
a coherent doctrine in light of evolving societal norms.
Courts and commentators have followed a misguided approach to
technology’s role in the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Faced with the difficult
problem of assessing jurisdiction in the unfamiliar cyberworld, some lower
courts initially embarked on an ill-fated journey, following an Internet-specific
test into a maze of disjointed results and a muddled doctrine that tends to
discount the import of virtual contacts. These courts viewed the Internet and the
contacts that arose from it as so different from the physical contacts that existing
personal jurisdiction doctrines contemplated that they required a special test.
However, not only has technological innovation outmoded this special test but
the underlying premise that virtual contacts cannot be put on par with physical
contacts is incorrect. The new norm, virtual contacts can fit within the traditional
personal jurisdiction doctrines without a change in doctrine at all.
This Note argues that the virtual nature of contacts should support—not
undermine—a finding of personal jurisdiction. Discounting virtual contacts as
insufficient contacts misapprehends the role that technology and remote
connection play in the daily lives of Americans today. The COVID-19
pandemic, and the vast increase in the reliance on remote technology that has
followed and will continue, has shown that virtual contacts are the new norm
and can create meaningful connection between forum states. This new step—
rather, leap—towards an increasingly technological society therefore should
lead courts to adopt a unified and corrected approach to virtual contacts in the
personal jurisdiction inquiry. This Note proposes that courts discard the nowoutdated Internet-specific test and instead use the familiar tools from
International Shoe and its progeny to assess the new remote-technology era and
the future innovations sure to come. Through three approaches, this Note offers
a more consistent personal jurisdiction doctrine that reflects both the doctrine’s
traditions and the realities of an ever-evolving society increasingly reliant on
virtual contacts.
Part I examines the existing problem of virtual contacts in the personal
jurisdiction analysis and how the COVID-19 pandemic, and the increase in
remote technology, complicate and exacerbate this problem. Without court and
commentator consensus on how to deal with virtual contacts and without the
flexibility to encompass inevitable technological evolution, lower court
precedent is disjointed, increasingly inapplicable to today’s ever-evolving
Ky. 2019); Stuart v. Churn LLC, No. 1:19-CV-369, 2019 WL 2342354, at *6 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2019); King v.
Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2019); Liqui-Box Corp. v. Scholle IPN Corp., No. 19 C 4069,
2020 WL 5593755, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020); Wallens v. Milliman Fin. Risk Mgmt. LLC, 509 F. Supp.
3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
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virtual world, and ultimately unfair to the technology user. The COVID-19
pandemic has forced a seismic shift towards reliance on remote technology,
altering how society and courts view the fairness of placing virtual contacts on
the same footing as physical contacts in the personal jurisdiction analysis and
making the need for an adjusted approach more pressing.
Part II proposes a solution: applying the traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrines and principles to ever-evolving technology and an ever-evolving
society. Under three approaches, the traditional doctrines can accommodate
consideration of remote technology and can shift the analysis towards a finding
of personal jurisdiction in virtual contacts cases.
First, the virtual nature of virtual contacts does not preclude courts from
determining whether these contacts with a forum state are meaningful. In
particular, out-of-state defendants can still purposefully avail themselves and
seek and obtain the benefits and protection of forum states through the use of
remote technology. Causes of action may also arise out of or relate to virtual
activities. Further, the increase in reliance on technology makes it reasonably
foreseeable that some defendants may be haled into court in a forum state based
on these virtual contacts. Additionally, because remote technology is becoming
more widespread, virtual contacts may increase the overall number of contacts
defendants have with a particular forum state, fortifying the analysis.
Second, these virtual contacts may comport with an increasingly
interconnected society’s traditional notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”
With roots in society’s changing business and social practices and increased
interactions across state lines, the “fair play and substantial justice” standard can
accommodate modern changes, such as the widespread use of remote technology
following a norm-shifting pandemic.
Third, the fairness factors provide an effective framework for assessing the
fairness of exercising jurisdiction, even over out-of-state remote-technology
users. The expanded reliance on and use of technology affects each of the
factors. In particular, by lessening the burdens on out-of-state defendants,
increasing the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, increasing the
plaintiffs’ interest in effective relief, and increasing the several states’ shared
interest in furthering fundamental social policies, incorporating remote
technology into the analysis will often tilt the scale towards finding personal
jurisdiction in virtual contacts cases.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
POST-PANDEMIC WORLD
Currently and in recent years, courts have tended to treat virtual contacts
as insufficient, discounting them as nonmeaningful connections with the forum
state, or so foreign to the traditional personal jurisdiction inquiry that they
require a special test. With the advent of the Internet came excitement about the
seemingly endless possibilities it provided, awe at the increased accessibility of
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information previously unavailable, and confusion regarding how to treat it
under the law.4 In their efforts to avoid creating universal jurisdiction in cases
involving Internet activities, courts opted for Internet-specific tests. The leading
Internet-specific test that courts crafted, however, has created more confusion
than clarity, and new technology has already proven this special test outdated
and a poor fit for an increasingly interconnected society. The COVID-19
pandemic, and the seismic shift to the virtual world it spurred, urge an answer to
the question of virtual contacts. The lower courts’ disjointed and misguided
attempts at an answer, and the Supreme Court’s silence on—yet recent interest
in—the issue make the question even more pressing.
A. THE EXISTING QUESTION OF VIRTUAL CONTACTS AND THE PITFALLS OF A
SPECIAL TEST
The increased prevalence and social acceptance of remote technology for
all kinds of interstate contacts have outpaced the evolution of personal
jurisdiction doctrine, leaving court precedent confused, outdated, and unfair.
The Supreme Court, which has recently noted that “internet transactions . . . may
raise doctrinal questions of their own,”5 so far has avoided deciding a virtual
contacts case, explicitly “leav[ing] questions about virtual contacts for another
day.”6 Although this day has not yet come, lower courts have attempted their
own solutions.7 These solutions have resulted in disjointed precedent and a
misguided approach to the evolving problem of virtual contacts in a way that
tends to discount the import of these contacts. Now that lower courts have
offered solutions and technology has become an even more dominant—and
continuously changing—aspect of everyday life, it is time to identify a more

4. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (“Taken together, these tools constitute
a unique medium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t
Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1147, 1156 (2005) (“[J]udges initially faced with personal jurisdiction issues intertwined with Internet
activities were awed with the universal accessibility of information available on the Internet.”).
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 n.4 (2021); see also Transcript
of Oral Argument at *57, Ford, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (No. 19-368), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2020/19-368_m648.pdf (showing Mr. Deepak Gupta, the attorney on behalf of the
Respondents, stating, “You know, on the Internet, again, I just think that is probably the most vexing issue in
personal jurisdiction”).
6. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n.9 (2014) (stating that “whether and how a defendant’s virtual
‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State” would be “very different questions”);
see also J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I do not doubt
that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated
by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.”).
7. In particular, courts have adopted and used the sliding scale established in Zippo to assess Internet
contacts. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Zippo’s sliding
scale is the leading Internet-specific test. Before Zippo, courts took a broad approach to Internet activities in the
personal jurisdiction inquiry, resulting in what began to look like universal jurisdiction for the Internet. See infra
note 11.
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flexible approach to technology-based contacts in the personal jurisdiction
analysis.
An approach that gained early traction amongst courts—courts which were
undoubtedly relieved to have a solution to the vexing problem of the Internet in
personal jurisdiction8—was the oft-discussed Zippo sliding scale.9 Zippo’s
sliding scale was a welcome initial answer to a puzzling question.10 Avoiding
the problem of creating universal jurisdiction with Internet activities,11 Zippo
tied personal jurisdiction in Internet cases to the nature and quality of the Internet
activities in question.12 It made practical sense: generally, the more interactive
the website, the more an out-of-state defendant website owner could be said to
be contacting the forum state.13 However, its flaws quickly surfaced.
Confusion arose as lower courts applied the sliding scale differently,
resulting in disjointed caselaw and unpredictable outcomes.14 Accordingly,
despite high hopes for a simple test for Internet jurisdiction, Zippo’s sliding scale
ultimately did more to complicate the question than to answer it. Left lingering
is the question of how Zippo’s special test for Internet activities fits with existing
doctrines.15 The existence of a special test may mean that this test replaces

8. Zippo provided a simple solution to a complex problem, and courts quickly embraced its proposal. See
Yokoyama, supra note 4, at 1149 (“In Zippo’s wake, many courts, in their zealous and understandable quest to
adopt a single standard for all Internet jurisdiction issues, have improvidently chosen to apply a unitary test
based on Zippo to all Internet jurisdiction issues.”); see also Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d
1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (finding the Zippo analysis “helpful in this relatively new and changing area of law”);
Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991, 996 (2004) (calling the judge in Zippo
“very, very forward thinking” for crafting this Internet-specific test). Zippo also provided an answer early in the
age of the Internet. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123 (“With this global revolution looming on the horizon, the
development of the law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its
infant stages.”).
9. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
10. In fact, most circuit courts have adopted Zippo’s sliding scale in some manner. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us,
Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344,
352 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1057 (2021); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th
Cir. 1999); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Arden, 614
F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011).
11. Before Zippo, some courts started down this ultimately unworkable path. See, e.g., Heroes, Inc. v.
Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding personal jurisdiction with Internet page accessible by
individuals in the forum state); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (same);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding personal jurisdiction with
Internet advertisements accessibly by individuals in the forum state). “[T]he search for a uniform test
encompassing the whole of Internet jurisdiction issues is ultimately a misguided exercise, and one that has caused
much of the disarray in Internet jurisdiction jurisprudence.” Yokoyama, supra note 4, at 1150.
12. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
13. Id.
14. See Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe Is Needed to Walk Through Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 1, 25 (2000) (“Although all of the courts seem to enunciate the same basic rules of law, they do
not appear to apply them with any sense of uniformity.”).
15. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,”
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2015) (“Most courts to confront the problem of Internet-based jurisdiction
have relied favorably on Zippo, even though the test’s supposed virtues are chimerical. It distorts the doctrine
and its guiding principles . . . . And it has proved conspicuously indeterminate. Yet it endures.”).
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existing doctrines entirely when the case involves Internet activities.16 In the
alternative, it may simply add to the tools available to courts assessing
jurisdiction.17 Either way, it is not clear how courts should proceed in this
analysis—by applying Zippo as a stand-alone test that replaces the traditional
doctrines or as a gloss on top of them. Zippo therefore added an unpredictable
sliding scale to the available tools for assessing personal jurisdiction without
clarifying its role in the analysis, leaving courts without a way to reconcile
longstanding doctrines with a new test for a new technology, all without clear
guidelines.18
This confusion only increased with websites that fell in the middle of the
sliding scale, so-called “interactive” websites.19 In this middle ground, Zippo
“offer[ed] little guidance,”20 and as more websites fit into this wide
classification, the question of personal jurisdiction further troubled courts and
led to variance amongst the lower courts.21 With such little guidance, anything
or nothing could fit within this classification. Paradoxically, Zippo then
paradoxically has led to both the expansion of personal jurisdiction in some
cases because many websites could fit within its wide classification,22 and an
unfair denial of it in others because courts have tended to discount the import of

16. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze
Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72 (2006) (“Welcome to the world of Internet-based
jurisdiction, a realm in which courts have created new jurisdictional principles for analyzing contacts mediated
through cyberspace that depart from the traditional jurisdictional principles articulated in cases involving
contacts made in real space. In this world, new considerations such as a Web site’s ‘interactivity’ and ‘target
audience’ are the essential concepts courts use to determine whether to treat virtual contacts as minimum
contacts. The courts believe that these new concepts, which seem to be more suited to the Internet, have
supplanted traditional considerations.”).
17. See David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy O. Stitham, Back to the Future: Revisiting Zippo in Light of
“Modern Concerns,” 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 231, 237 (2011) (“[T]he additional gloss
provided by Zippo—the three-pronged (and now outdated) shorthand to determine the likelihood of jurisdiction
over an Internet operator—might, in the end, be nothing more than a confusing distraction from the jurisdictional
analysis.”).
18. Zippo therefore no longer offers the insights courts and commentators initially considered it to provide.
See id. at 232 (“While Zippo, the case, contained a significant insight into the role of the Internet in personal
jurisdiction, Zippo, the test, has strayed from that insight, becoming an impediment rather than an aid to
jurisdictional analysis.”).
19. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
20. Roblor Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. GPS Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1141 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“We share
in the criticism of over-reliance on the sliding scale of interactivity analysis. The sliding scale offers little
guidance in the case of a defendant running a website that falls in the middle ground.”).
21. Compare Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative Controls, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1175 (D. Utah 2016)
(finding that the Zippo approach is “particularly troubling” in light of the “the exponential growth in the number
of interactive websites” at the time the case was decided and in the future “as more individuals and businesses
create interactive websites”), with Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that
“the reasoning of Zippo is persuasive”).
22. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 17, at 242 (“The ‘modern concern’ . . . is not that a
contacts-based jurisprudence cannot adequately deal with Internet-based contacts, but rather that a Zippo-based
jurisprudence will swallow the doctrine of personal jurisdiction whole. If every business with a virtual presence
can be sued anywhere, and virtually every business is online, then virtually every business can be sued virtually
anywhere.”).
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virtual contacts.23 This wide classification has thus “created a black hole of
doubt and confusion.”24
Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative Controls, Inc.25 provides a salient
illustration and discussion of the problems with Internet-specific tests, with
particular focus on Zippo. The case involved copyright and patent infringement
claims by a Utah company against a Michigan company.26 The defendant
company maintained and advertised its products on a website on which
customers, including those from Utah, could make purchases.27 However, there
was no evidence that the website or advertisements specifically targeted Utah
customers.28 In assessing the defendant company’s Internet contacts, the court
found that, on Zippo’s sliding scale, the website would fall into the “highly
interactive” classification because it “allowed users to place orders for products”
and the “defendant clearly [did] business over the internet, . . . .”29 Therefore,
under Zippo, the court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant
company “based solely on the existence of its website.”30 The court noted that
“[t]his would be the case even though [the plaintiff] has not pled any facts to
suggest that any Utah resident actually viewed or interacted with [the
defendant’s] website, . . . .”31 The court found that this result—a finding of
personal jurisdiction despite a lack of any actual contact, physical or virtual, with
the forum state—demonstrated Zippo’s fatal flaw:
The lack of any specific instances of [the defendant’s] physical or digital
contacts with Utah demonstrates why the Zippo sliding scale should not
replace traditional personal jurisdiction analysis. Specifically, it
highlights Zippo’s primary defect. The Zippo test effectively removes
geographical limitations on personal jurisdiction over entities that have
interactive websites. And because the number of entities that have interactive
websites continues to grow exponentially, application of the Zippo framework
would essentially eliminate the traditional geographic limitations on personal
jurisdiction.32

Further issues arise with considerations of the increasingly “digital age.”33
The court noted that almost anyone can create a website and that almost all of

23. See Spencer, supra note 16, at 72 (“[C]ourts have improperly altered traditional analysis in a way that
results in an overly restrictive view of when virtual contacts may support jurisdiction.”).
24. Yokoyama, supra note 4, at 1166.
25. 157 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (D. Utah 2016).
26. Id. at 1170. The court ultimately found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the patent claim,
but it did over the copyright claim based on other contacts. Id.
27. Id. at 1170–71.
28. Id. at 1171.
29. Id. at 1174 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997))
(alteration in original).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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these websites will be interactive.34 “Given the exponential growth in the
number of interactive websites, the Zippo approach—which would remove
personal jurisdiction’s geographical limitations based on the mere existence of
those those [sic] websites—is particularly troubling. And the problem would
grow more acute every year as more individuals and businesses create
interactive websites.”35 Based on these considerations, the court ultimately
found the Zippo approach “unpersuasive” and instead found that “[t]he
traditional tests are readily adaptable to the digital age, just as they were to
technological advances like the telegraph, radio, television, and telephone.”36
The sliding scale’s usefulness further decreased as technology evolved
beyond the three classifications in the sliding scale.37 It was no longer so easy—
if it ever were38—to fit Internet contacts into Zippo’s paradigm examples. More
than ever, and as the court in Kindig It Design explained,39 Zippo does not fully
answer the question. Rather, it addresses only some types of websites, while
virtual contacts today include a much wider range of conduct. For example,
virtual contacts include not only contacts through a website but also contacts
through email, video calls, social media pages, and all kinds of interactive
technology. As technology evolves, this list of modes of interaction that do not
fit neatly into Zippo’s sliding scale will only grow. The even newer rise in
remote technology, including its ubiquity in daily life, reveals the need for a
better answer on how to treat these contacts in the personal jurisdiction inquiry.
In short, “[a]s technology has continued to evolve, the Zippo test has failed to
evolve with it.”40 The result has been a tendency to discount the meaningfulness
of virtual contacts as courts forge ahead without a clear consensus or coherent
approach.41
The confusion and ill fit that inevitably accompany new tests based on new
technology are the strongest arguments for fitting such technology into existing
tests. Instead of crafting another Zippo-esque test that addresses the specific
challenges of today’s virtual world, courts should note that technology evolves
faster than courts can create new tests, despite their best efforts. Accordingly,
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1175.
36. Id. at 1175–76.
37. See Celia Kaechele, Note, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice in the Age of
Internet Interconnectivity: How Masking an IP Address Could Constitute Purposeful Availment, 21 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 59, 59 (2019) (“The confusion resulting from this lack of consensus over the doctrine’s application has
been further compounded by advances in technology. Technology has enabled people to connect in new ways
and the Court has struggled to reconcile this with the traditional minimum contacts analysis it first employed
in International Shoe v. Washington.”).
38. See Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 430 (2004) (“This passive/interactive test represents an egregious
failure of legal imagination.”).
39. 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1174–75.
40. Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal
Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 79 (2011).
41. See infra Part I.C.
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they should adopt an approach that allows for both a coherent doctrine and the
flexibility to accommodate current and future technological innovations. Some
courts, like the court in Kindig It Design,42 have already favored an analysis that
hews closer to traditional personal jurisdiction doctrines than a new test specially
crafted for the Internet.43 These traditional doctrines can encompass new ways
of looking at new technology.44 Therefore, when assessing personal jurisdiction
in an increasingly virtual world, the traditional tests should prevail as the best
path forward.45
B. THE INCREASED RELIANCE ON REMOTE TECHNOLOGY IN THE PANDEMIC
AND POST-PANDEMIC WORLDS
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates the issue. The current pandemic has
increased many Americans’ reliance on remote technology,46 and this reliance

42. 157 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
43. See, e.g., Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 2002), overruled by
Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Just as our traditional notions of
personal jurisdiction have proven adaptable to other changes in the national economy, so too are they adaptable
to the transformations wrought by the Internet.”); GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“We do not believe that the advent of advanced technology, say, as with the
Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court jurisdiction.”); Illinois v. Hemi Grp.
LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e think that the traditional due process inquiry . . . is not so difficult
to apply to cases involving Internet contacts that courts need some sort of easier-to-apply categorical test.”); Best
Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir. 2007); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d
1339, 1355 n.10 (11th Cir. 2013).
44. See Emily Ekland, Comment, Scaling Back Zippo: The Downside to the Zippo Sliding Scale and
Proposed Alternatives to Its Uses, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 380, 396 (2012) (“Courts should refocus on traditional
principles and forget interactivity . . . . [T]raditional concepts are adaptable to evolving technology.”).
45. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1073
(4th ed. West 2020) (“[T]he [Zippo] approach should be understood at best as a jurisprudential heuristic, and at
worst as potentially misleading. Ultimately, personal jurisdiction over a defendant that maintains a website must,
like personal jurisdiction over all other defendants, satisfy the jurisdictional constraints placed upon the federal
court by the forum state or any applicable federal statute and the due process analysis established by
International Shoe Company v. State of Washington and its progeny.”). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth
Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]here are grounds for questioning the
standard that the Court adopted in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, . . .”); id. at 1036 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“With the old International Shoe dichotomy looking increasingly uncertain, it’s hard not to ask
how we got here and where we might be headed.”).
46. See, e.g., Rita Zeidner, Coronavirus Makes Work from Home the New Normal, S.H.R.M. (Mar. 21,
2020),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/remote-work-has-become-the-newnormal.aspx. The successes of technology companies, in particular, during the pandemic evidence this increased
reliance on technology. See, e.g., Kari Paul & Dominic Rushe, Tech Giants’ Shares Soar as Companies Benefit
from Covid-19 Pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (July 30, 2020, 5:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2020/jul/30/amazon-apple-facebook-google-profits-earnings; Rani Molla, As Covid-19 Surges, the World’s
Biggest Tech Companies Report Staggering Profits, VOX: RECODE (Oct. 30, 2020, 10:35 AM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/10/30/21541699/big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-apple-coronavirusprofits; Shannon Bond, Zoom Turns Record Profit Thanks to Coronavirus Shutdowns, N.P.R. (Aug. 31, 2020,
7:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/08/31/908089517/zoom-turns-recordprofit-thanks-to-coronavirus-shutdowns; Aaron Tilley, Microsoft’s Earnings Continue to Ride Pandemic-Fueled
Demand for Cloud, Videogaming, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
microsofts-earnings-continue-to-ride-pandemic-fueled-demand-for-cloud-videogaming-11603831078.
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is expected to continue in the post-pandemic world.47 These seismic changes
will impact how society—and courts—look at contacts and the fairness of
exercising jurisdiction over defendants who enter forum states via remote
technology.
“The COVID-19 pandemic will likely have generational consequences
across most aspects of society, from the everyday to the existential.”48 Indeed, it
is no news at this point that the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically altered the
way Americans work, study, shop, socialize, and connect with others, in some
cases upending and reshaping how these activities are done.49 Spreading through
interpersonal contact,50 the virus left corporations, organizations, employers,
and individuals shifting to socially distant and quarantined life.51 For many, this
meant a “renewed interest in remote working, as businesses face[d] a bleak set
of options: continue business as usual but with the risk of grave illness, shut

47. See, e.g., John Kamensky, The Future of Work Post-Pandemic: We’re Not Going Back, GOV’T EXEC.
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/10/future-work-post-pandemic-were-not-goingback/169556; David Ignatius, There’s No Question We’ll Be Living in a Different World Post-Pandemic, WASH.
POST (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theres-no-question-well-be-living-in-adifferent-world-post-pandemic/2020/10/08/7e66e234-09a4-11eb-a166-dc429b380d10_story.html;
Craig
Timberg, Drew Harwell, Laura Reiley & Abha Bhattarai, The New Coronavirus Economy: A Gigantic
Experiment Reshaping How We Work and Live, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2020/03/21/economy-change-lifestyle-coronavirus; Rani Molla, 10 Ways Office Work Will Never Be
the Same, VOX: RECODE (Mar. 23, 2021, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22331447/10-ways-officework-pandemic-future-remote-work.
48. J.P. MORGAN INT’L COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE POST-COVID WORLD 2 (2021),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-co/documents/jpmc-preparing-postcovid.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Alex Bartik, Zoe Cullen, Edward Glaeser, Michael Luca & Christopher Stanton, How the
COVID-19 Crisis Is Reshaping Remote Working, VOXEU: CEPR (July 19, 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/howcovid-19-crisis-reshaping-remote-working; Amanda Barroso, About Half of Americans Say Their Lives Will
Remain Changed in Major Ways When the Pandemic Is Over, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/17/about-half-of-americans-say-their-lives-will-remainchanged-in-major-ways-when-the-pandemic-is-over. A shared experience, this sudden and widespread shift
often left people bonding over the common, humorous mistakes with remote technology individuals made during
this shift. See, e.g., Samantha McLaren, 4 Humorous Remote Work Moments for When You Need a Break,
LINKEDIN: TALENT BLOG (July 29, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/business/talent/blog/talent-acquisition/
humorous-remote-work-moments.
50. How COVID-19 Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html (last updated July 14, 2021).
51. See Bartik et al., supra note 49; see also Guidance for Businesses and Employers Responding to
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2021) (advising
businesses on responding to COVID-19); How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last updated
Jan. 20, 2022) (advising, among other things, that social distancing helps prevent the spread of COVID-19);
Activities and Gatherings, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/
2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/index.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2021) (advising on how to safely interact with
others).
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down the business, or transition to working from home.”52 Life in quarantine
required using remote technology in greater amounts than ever before.53
As technology has evolved, its adoption has accelerated over time.54
Though the increased use of technology was likely inevitable in some areas of
daily life, the increase that came with and will likely follow the pandemic is
exponential.55 In fact, “[d]igitization, artificial intelligence, remote work,
automation, and other advancements are accelerating as a result of the crisis and
revolutionizing the way we learn and do business.”56 Specifically, the
“[u]nprecedented restrictions on travel, physical interactions, and changes in
consumer behavior since COVID-19 took hold has forced companies and
consumers to change the way they operate. This has spurred digital
transformations in a matter of weeks rather than months or years.”57
In particular, at least one aspect of daily life that struggled to shift to remote
technology before the pandemic required it has done so: work.58 Before a virus
52. Bartik et al., supra note 49.
53. “The abrupt closure of many offices and workplaces [in the spring of 2020] ushered in a new era of
remote work for millions of employed Americans and may portend a significant shift in the way a large segment
of the workforce operates in the future.” KIM PARKER, JULIANA MENASCE HOROWITZ & RACHEL MINKIN, PEW
RSCH. CTR., HOW THE CORONAVIRUS OUTBREAK HAS—AND HASN’T—CHANGED THE WAY AMERICANS WORK
4 (2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/12/09/how-the-coronavirus-outbreak-has-and-hasntchanged-the-way-americans-work.
54. See Louisa Fitzgerald, How Emerging Tech Adoption Is Evolving and Accelerating, COMPTIA (Aug.
6, 2020), https://www.comptia.org/blog/how-emerging-tech-adoption-is-evolving-and-accelerating. The
adoption of new technologies has been particularly quick in the pandemic and post-pandemic worlds. See id.
(“For many companies, the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the pace at which technology is being
implemented—from the move away from on-premise infrastructure to the cloud to the increase in conversations
around implementing technologies that can help businesses evolve.”).
55. See Laura LaBerge, Clayton O’Toole, Jeremy Schneider & Kate Smaje, How COVID-19 Has Pushed
Companies Over the Technology Tipping Point—And Transformed Business Forever, MCKINSEY (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/how-covid-19-haspushed-companies-over-the-technology-tipping-point-and-transformed-business-forever
(showing
the
“quantum leap” that digital technology has taken during the pandemic); Ella Koeze & Nathaniel Popper, The
Virus Changed the Way We Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/04/07/technology/coronavirus-internet-use.html (showing Americans’ use of different remote and other
technologies graphically).
56. J.P. MORGAN INT’L COUNCIL, supra note 48.
57. Susan Lund, Wan-Lae Cheng, André Dua, Aaron De Smet, Olivia Robinson & Saurabh Sanghvi, What
800 Executives Envision for the Postpandemic Workforce, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/what-800-executives-envision-for-thepostpandemic-workforce; see also Molla, supra note 47 (quoting Nicholas Bloom, a Stanford University
professor, who stated, “One of the few great upsides of the pandemic is we’ve accelerated 25 years of drift
toward working from home in one year[]”).
58. COVID-19 reduced this struggle, pushing employers and employees towards acceptance of remote
work. See, e.g., Kamensky, supra note 47; Daniella Silva, Coronavirus Has Lifted the Work-From-Home Stigma.
How Will That Shape the Future?, N.B.C. NEWS (May 13, 2020, 5:53 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/coronavirus-has-lifted-work-home-stigma-how-will-shape-future-n1205376 (“Even as dozens of states
have begun to partly reopen months after the initial shutdowns, experts said that past stigma around working
from home has largely been lifted and that they expected much more remote work to be incorporated into office
life for the foreseeable future.”); Lund et al., supra note 57 (“[T]he crisis may accelerate some workforce trends
already underway, such as the adoption of automation and digitization, increased demand for contractors and
gig workers, and more remote work.”).
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that spread through interpersonal contact plagued the workplace, remote work
was highly stigmatized. The stigma arose from notions that remote work meant
decreased efforts, productivity, and dedication.59 As a result, pre-pandemic, “the
adoption of [telework] arrangements was slow, and industry observers predicted
it would take years to transition. However, in mid-March [of 2020], the
coronavirus pandemic struck and much of the U.S. pivoted to a new
workplace—home.”60 In fact, “[b]efore the pandemic Americans spent 5% of
their working time at home. By spring 2020 the figure was 60%.”61 Following
this abrupt shift to remote work that COVID-19 necessitated, “[m]any
employers were made to confront what they had neither fully embraced nor
believed: that large-scale remote working is both possible and effective.”62
Crucially, “[t]he rationale for telework quickly pivoted from being seen as
family-friendly policy to a vital element for the continuity of operations in both
public and private sector organizations[,]”63 helping reduce the stigma around
remote work. Now that COVID-19 has forced society to more or less clear this
hurdle,64 make strides towards removing this stigma,65 and see the benefits and

59. See Lund et al., supra note 57 (“Before the pandemic, remote work had struggled to establish much of
a beachhead, as companies worried about its impact on productivity and corporate culture.”); Nicholas Bloom,
Op-Ed: Work Life Will Never Be the Same. We Need Some In-person Days and Some Remote, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
8, 2022, 3:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-02-08/remote-work-pandemic-working-fromhome-return-to-office-hybrid-diversity-commute-pollution (“Before the pandemic, few people took remote
work seriously. Researching the phenomenon for almost 20 years, I frequently heard disparaging comments like
‘working from home, shirking from home’ and ‘working remotely, remotely working.’”).
60. Kamensky, supra note 47.
61. The Rise of Working from Home, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.economist.com/specialreport/2021/04/08/the-rise-of-working-from-home.
62. J.P. MORGAN INT’L COUNCIL, supra note 48.
63. Kamensky, supra note 47.
64. However, it should be noted that some of the same groups stigmatized by remote work pre-pandemic
continue to struggle during the pandemic. See Alisha Haridasani Gupta, Why Some Women Call This Recession
a ‘Shecession,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/us/unemploymentcoronavirus-women.html; Katherine Riley & Stephanie Stamm, Nearly 1.5 Million Mothers Are Still Missing
from the Workforce, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 27, 2021, 10:14 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nearly-1-5-millionmothers-are-still-missing-from-the-workforce-11619472229; Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Julia Gillard &
Herminia Ibarra, Why WFH Isn’t Necessarily Good for Women, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 16, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/07/why-wfh-isnt-necessarily-good-for-women; Rebecca Greenfield, Work from Home Has
the Power to Advance Equality—or Set It Back, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2021, 3:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-27/work-from-home-remote-work-could-advance-or-setback-equality; see also Justin Baer, Theo Francis & Eric Morath, The Covid Economy Carves Deep Divide
Between Haves and Have-Nots, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2020, 11:09 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-covideconomy-carves-deep-divide-between-haves-and-have-nots-11601910595 (discussing the adverse effects of the
pandemic on “workers with historic disadvantages”). Additionally, this stigma may creep back as employees
feel pressured to return to in-person work, even in hybrid work environments. See Kathryn Vasel, The Pandemic
Forced a Massive Remote-Work Experiment. Now Comes the Hard Part, CNN BUS. (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/09/success/remote-work-covid-pandemic-one-year-later/index.html
(quoting
Andrew Hewitt, a senior analyst at Forrester, who stated, “We’ve been playing remote work on easy mode.
We’ve all been doing the same thing, everybody has had equal access to information and promotions, . . . It will
get harder in 2021 with hybrid”).
65. Some disagree about whether this stigma is truly gone. Compare Silva, supra note 58 (arguing that, by
forcing millions of Americans to work from home, COVID-19 has eliminated the work-from-home stigma), with
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feasibility of remote work, remote work will likely find its way into some
employees’ futures.
Surveys predict that the post-pandemic workforce will involve more
remote work than in the pre-pandemic world.66 The shift to remote work that
was necessary during the pandemic revealed positive aspects of working from
home that some employees realized they want to continue even without this
necessity.67 Some of these aspects include saving time on their commutes,68
gaining flexibility in their schedules,69 moving to less populated and less
expensive areas,70 and, for some, even a feeling of “getting back to their lives.”71
Chamorro-Premuzic et. al., supra note 64 (challenging the conclusion that the changed attitudes about working
from home following COVID-19 will “be a big equalizer for women”).
66. See, e.g., Lund et al., supra note 57; PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 4. Other commentators have
made similar predictions. See, e.g., Kamensky, supra note 47; Ignatius, supra note 47; Timberg et al., supra note
47; Katherine Guyot & Isabel V. Sawhill, Telecommuting Will Likely Continue Long After the Pandemic,
BROOKINGS: BLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/04/06/telecommuting-willlikely-continue-long-after-the-pandemic; Work-at-Home After Covid-19—Our Forecast, GLOB. WORKPLACE
ANALYTICS, https://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/work-at-home-after-covid-19-our-forecast (last visited Mar.
13, 2022); Kathryn Vasel, How Google, Microsoft and Others Plan to Work Post-Pandemic, CNN BUS. (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/22/success/companies-future-of-work/index.html; Alexander W.
Bartik, Zoë Cullen, Edward L. Glaeser, Michael Luca & Christopher Stanton, What Jobs Are Being Done at
Home During the COVID-19 Crisis? Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No.
20-138, 2020), https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/20-138_ec6ff0f0-7947-4607-9d54c5c53044fb95.pdf.
67. See PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 17 (“[A] majority of those who say their job can be done from
home say they’d like to telework all or most of the time post-pandemic . . . .”); Johanna Weststar, Carolyn Troup,
David Peetz, Ioana Ramia, Sean O’Brady, Shalene Werth, Shelagh Campbell & Susan Ressia, Working from
Home During COVID-19: What Do Employees Really Want?, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 4, 2021, 1:10 PM),
https://theconversation.com/working-from-home-during-covid-19-what-do-employees-really-want-148424
(“People vary a lot in how much they want to work from home, but one thing is clear — most want to do some
of their paid work from home, but few want to work at home all the time.”).
68. See Bryan Walsh, The Many Benefits of Commute-Free Remote Work, AXIOS (Aug. 29, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/commute-remote-work-benefits-fe55566b-af80-4a2f-95ce-2140ca6b358c.html
(“Commuting was costing American workers an increasing amount of time, money and life satisfaction. After a
glimpse of life without the daily slog, workers may not want to go back to normal, . . . .”).
69. See Cyril Bouquet, How COVID-19 Caused the Future of Work to Arrive Early, INST. FOR MGMT. DEV.
(June 2020), https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/How-COVID-19-caused-the-future-of-work-toarrive-early (discussing workers that are “enjoying the increased freedom that comes with working fewer hours
and/or being able to adjust their schedules according to family needs”); Guyot & Sawhill, supra note 66 (“[I]t
helps people (especially women) balance work and family roles.”). But see Michelle F. Davis & Jeff Green,
Three Hours Longer, the Pandemic Workday Has Obliterated Work-Life Balance, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-23/working-from-home-in-covid-era-means-three-morehours-on-the-job (“With many living a few steps from their offices, America’s always-on work culture has
reached new heights. The 9-to-5 workday, or any semblance of it, seems like a relic of a bygone era. Long
gone are the regretful formalities for calling or emailing at inappropriate times. Burnt-out employees feel like
they have even less free time than when they wasted hours commuting.”).
70. See, e.g., Nellie Bowles, They Can’t Leave the Bay Area Fast Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/technology/san-francisco-covid-work-moving.html (“Remote work
offered a chance at residing for a few months in towns where life felt easier. Tech workers and their bosses
realized they might not need all the perks and after-work schmooze events. But maybe they needed elbow room
and a yard for the new puppy. A place to put the Peloton. A top public school.”).
71. Molla, supra note 47 (quoting Ali Rayl, Slack’s VP of customer experience, who stated, “A lot of our
employees said, ‘I’m getting more sleep,’ ‘I’m exercising more,’ ‘I’m making myself healthier food,’ ‘I know
my neighbors more,’[] . . . . And people are really digging that kind of getting back to their lives”).
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Employers also saw benefits to remote work, including enjoying the fruits of a
wider talent pool without geographic restrictions72 and the potential to save
money on office space and business travel.73 Although many have experienced
the dreaded “Zoom fatigue,”74 flexibility in work arrangements through remote
technology will likely be a common path forward in the post-pandemic world.75
In fact, “[m]ost workers welcome the option to work remotely one or more days
per week[,]”76 and some believe “[w]e have moved beyond the theme of remote

A survey even showed that sixty-four percent of employees would prefer to work from home
permanently instead of receiving a thirty-thousand dollar pay raise. See Andy Medici, Work from Home or a
$30k Raise? Employees Said It Wasn’t Even Close, BUS. JS. (May 13, 2021, 1:40 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/news/2021/05/13/wfh-work-from-home-raise-salary-googlefacebook.html (quoting Kyum Kim, Blind co-founder and head of U.S. Operations, who stated, “[Remote work]
became the new norm, and I don’t think people would want to go back. Covid forced people to stay out of the
office but you can’t force people to go back to the office because there are alternative jobs that offer working
from home[.] . . . Even if you are willing to pay them $30,000 more a year, that’s not even enough reason to
make people come back to the office”).
72. See 5 Predictions for Talent Markets After the Pandemic, CIELO (May 2020),
https://www.cielotalent.com/insights/5-predictions-for-talent-markets-after-the-pandemic (“If hiring managers
are more willing to allow remote working, the number of potential candidates for any given job increases.
Geography becomes less of a qualifier if working remotely is an option.”).
73. See Vivienne Walt, COVID-19 Will Change the Entire Notion of Offices: Companies Eye Rental
Savings After Working from Home, FORTUNE (Apr. 19, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/04/19/coronavirusgoing-back-to-work-from-home-commercial-real-estate-offices; Mark Bergen, Google Is Saving Over $1
Billion a Year by Working from Home, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2021, 12:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2021-04-28/google-is-saving-over-1-billion-a-year-by-working-from-home; Work-at-Home After
Covid-19—Our Forecast, supra note 66 (“We also estimate work-from-home initiatives will save U.S.
employers over $30 Billion dollars a day during the Covid-19 crisis. This may be the tipping point for
remote work.”).
74. “Zoom fatigue” is a term coined during the pandemic to describe “the exhaustion you feel after any
kind of video call or conference.” ‘Zoom Fatigue’ Is Real—Here’s How to Cope (and Make It Through Your
Next Meeting), HEALTHLINE (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.healthline.com/health/zoom-fatigue; see also Chip
Cutter, Even the CEO of Zoom Says He Has Zoom Fatigue, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2021, 5:17 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/even-the-ceo-of-zoom-says-he-has-zoom-fatigue-11620151459 (“Though some
[executives] said they expect more flexible work arrangements to endure going forward, they say there are clear
signs of burnout in an era of nonstop video calls.”).
75. See, e.g., PwC’s U.S. Remote Work Survey, It’s Time to Reimagine Where and How Work Will Get
Done, PWC (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.pwc.com/us/remotework (finding that, although “[e]mployees and
employers don’t see eye to eye on the optimal schedule for remote work[,]” “[h]ybrid workplaces [are] likely to
become the norm”); Ashira Prossack, 4 Changes to Expect in the Post-Covid Workplace, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2021,
3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashiraprossack1/2021/04/12/4-changes-to-expect-in-the-post-covidworkplace (predicting that “[h]ybrid work becomes the norm[,]” and asserting that “[t]he evolution of the
workplace is far from over. As we collectively figure out what a post-Covid world looks like, it’s likely that
we’ll see workplaces change policies at lease [sic] once more this year. The best thing that companies can do is
continue to be flexible and try to create a workplace that balances both employee and employer needs”); Dina
Gerdeman, COVID Killed the Traditional Workplace. What Should Companies Do Now?, HARV. BUS. SCH.:
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 8, 2021), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/covid-killed-the-traditional-workplacewhat-should-companies-do-now (“Should companies do away with Zoom and return the workplace to its preCOVID ways? The answer, in a word: No.”).
76. Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis, Why Working from Home Will Stick 2 (Becker
Friedman Inst., Working Paper No. 2020-174, 2021), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/
BFI_WP_2020174.pdf.
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work being a temporary thing[.]”77 This type of hybrid work environment offers
remote work in moderation, thus allowing workers to continue to enjoy the
flexibility and sense of balance that remote work can provide while avoiding the
fatigue of endless availability and endless Zoom meetings. For many, remote
work—in some form—is the future.78
Other aspects of daily life will likely remain virtual as well. While some
see the pandemic’s shift to remote activities as a necessary but temporary evil,79
the increased use of remote technology will likely remain, though perhaps to a
lesser degree or for only some activities. Zoom happy hours, for example, may
cease to exist post-pandemic,80 but virtual meetings in place of daily commutes
to the office or business travel are more likely to remain.81 Even with the
eventual—and welcome—return to “normal,” the post-pandemic world will
likely include the continuation of some pandemic-era necessities, including the
shift towards remote work, activities, and interactions.82 In short, following its
quick, necessity-borne adoption, remote technology is here to stay.

77. Michael Liedtke & Barbara Ortutay, Silicon Valley Finds Remote Work Is Easier to Begin Than End,
AP NEWS (Sept. 8, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-technology-business-software-san-francisco9e49f60362702a18dc7180e6294599b4 (quoting Laura Boudreau, a Columbia University professor).
78. See GITLAB, 2021 REMOTE WORK REPORT 5 (2021), https://about.gitlab.com/resources/downloads/
remote-work-report-2021.pdf (indicating that 82% of respondents “believe that remote work is the future, and
that they have the tools and processes now that they need to communicate with their teams”).
79. In particular, some predict that the long-term isolation of pandemic life may increase people’s desires
to connect with others in person. See Timberg et al., supra note 47 (discussing the possibility that “other forays
into living and working online will convince many to return to routine human contact once they can”); Vasel,
supra note 64 (quoting Coveo CEO Louis Tetu, who stated, “Slack and Zoom are great, but there is no equivalent
of getting people together and fostering a common culture”).
80. Some hope to see this particular remote activity become a mere distant memory. See Ashley Fetters,
We Need to Stop Trying to Replicate the Life We Had, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/04/why-your-zoom-happy-hour-unsatisfying/609823.
81. See Timberg et al., supra note 47 (“Any traditional face-to-face encounter—going to an accountant’s
office, sending children to class, traveling for a business meeting—could someday seem less necessary as more
remote options become publicly acceptable and widespread.”); see also Work-at-Home After Covid-19—Our
Forecast, supra note 66 (“Covid-19 will also likely cause executives to rethink the need for travel to
meetings, conferences, etc. They will learn that while virtual meetings may not have all the same benefits
of being face-to-face, the savings may outweigh the costs much of the time.”); Bonnie Marcus, What Will It
Take for Companies and Employees to Succeed in the Post-Pandemic Workplace?, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2020, 1:32
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2020/08/11/what-will-it-take-for-companies-and-employeesto-succeed-in-the-post-pandemic-workplace/?sh=61e157c71593 (“The post-pandemic workplace will be a
blend of virtual and on-premise work. Virtual will likely end up being two-thirds of interaction given macrotrends accelerated by pandemic. A culture built around taking this into account is one that embraces technology
including its limitations and one that treats in-person connections as more intentional and precious.”).
82. See Molla, supra note 47 (“Someday, perhaps someday soon, when vaccination rates are high enough
and the coronavirus relents, the world will return to normal. But in its wake, something as massive and
meaningful as a global pandemic will leave many things different, including how we work.”); see also Christoph
Hilberath, Julie Kilmann, Deborah Lovich, Thalia Tzanetti, Allison Bailey, Stefanie Beck, Elizabeth Kaufman,
Bharat Khandelwal, Felix Schuler, & Kristi Woolsey, Hybrid Work Is the New Remote Work, BCG (Sept. 22,
2020), https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2020/managing-remote-work-and-optimizing-hybrid-workingmodels (“Our surveys over the past months indicate that employees and employers alike have little interest in
returning to pre-pandemic work models.”).

878

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:3

Because activities ranging from conducting business to attending law
school83 occurred virtually during the pandemic period, the reliance on
technology that made these remote activities possible will likely continue in
post-pandemic society. Specifically, the pandemic period saw a substantial
increase in the “digital intensity of workers’ days.”84 According to Microsoft’s
data, between February 2020 and February 2021, weekly meeting times
increased by 148%, the number of emails delivered increased by 40.6 billion,
and weekly chats per-person increased 45%,85 showing an overall increase in
virtual connection amongst remote workers. Additionally, “[p]eople spend an
additional hour—for a total of 10 hours—connected to Slack than they did prepandemic. The amount of time people spend actively working in or
communicating on Slack jumped 30 percent to 110 minutes a day, according to
the company.”86 These data indicate that remote-technology tools increasingly
exist “in the background and the foreground of our lives.”87 As this “digital
intensity” and fluency with remote-technology tools have increased, the
technology has adapted and will continue to adapt to the post-pandemic world’s
needs,88 easing the transition to a permanent or hybrid remote workplace and
increasing remote activities.
Ultimately, “[t]he repercussions of the shift are potentially far-reaching.
Not only has it already transformed the workdays of millions, it could create a
self-perpetuating cycle, as more workers become familiar with the virtual tools
needed to work remotely and organizations change to accommodate those
working out of the office.”89 Importantly, the pandemic forced many to confront
any barriers to adopting new technology and realize how useful remote
technology can be.90 The result has been, and will be, a vast increase in the use
of remote technology, a shift in how individuals connect with one another, and
a new way of thinking about virtual contacts in an advancing society. “‘This is
83. This activity is of particular relevance for this author. See Chancellor & Dean’s Off., COVID-19
Community Updates, U.C. HASTINGS L., https://www.uchastings.edu/chancellordean/covid-19-communityupdates (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
84. MICROSOFT, 2021WORK TREND INDEX: ANNUAL REPORT, THE NEXT GREAT DISRUPTION IS HYBRID
WORK: ARE WE READY? 8 (2021), https://ms-worklab.azureedge.net/files/reports/hybridWork/pdf/2021_
Microsoft_WTI_Report_March.pdf.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Molla, supra note 47.
87. Id.
88. See Joanna Stern, From Remote Work to Hybrid Work: The Tech You’ll Need to Link Home and Office,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-remote-work-to-hybrid-work-thetech-youll-need-to-link-home-and-office-11615726801?mod=article_inline (“Not only did we prove our tech
resilience when we embarked on the Great Work-From-Home Experiment a year ago but the makers of our most
depended-upon products are paying attention and adapting for this next phase.”).
89. Alvin Powell, What Will the New Post-Pandemic Normal Look Like?, HARV. GAZETTE (Nov. 24,
2020),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/11/our-post-pandemic-world-and-whats-likely-to-hanground.
90. See, e.g., id. (“‘What people have feared in the past is the technology aspects of it. And what we have
seen is that the technology part is the easiest thing that people have taken up . . . . I think that’s what’s going to
break this open for many, many people . . . .’”).
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an inflection point, and we’re going to look back and realize this is where it all
changed . . . .’”91
This dramatic shift—the increased and widespread use of remote
technology that arose out of the pandemic era—therefore makes more pressing
the question of personal jurisdiction in an increasingly technological society. As
society enters the post-pandemic world with this influx of remote-technology
use, the number of personal jurisdiction cases in which virtual contacts are the
only or primary contacts will continue to rise.92 A definitive answer on how to
deal with virtual contacts is now more pressing and needed than ever.93
C. AN UNSETTLED PROBLEM: THE RISE IN REMOTE TECHNOLOGY AND THE
MISGUIDED APPROACH
Remote technology’s increased use and acceptance only adds fuel to the
fire of an unclear, undefined answer on how to deal with virtual contacts. The
disjointed caselaw and confusion around virtual contacts will only compound in
the post-pandemic personal jurisdiction jurisprudence without a definitive
approach.
Even beyond Zippo’s limited purview,94 the confusion does not abate.
Some courts have considered virtual contacts in cases involving different modes
of virtual contact. However, there still is no uniformity in analysis or outcome.
For instance, some courts found personal jurisdiction where the plaintiff worked
remotely for the defendant employer.95 However, some did not.96 In particular,

91. Timberg et al., supra note 47 (quoting Jared Spataro, a Microsoft executive).
92. In fact, litigants are filing cases involving remote technology and remote work across various legal
claims. “Analysis of American legal filings in state and federal courts finds that the number of cases mentioning
‘work from home’ is running at twice pre-pandemic levels.” The Rise of Working From Home, supra note 61.
How courts will treat these virtual activities is a pressing question.
93. See Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the
Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 577 (1998) (“The modern development of the
Internet represents just the type of technological change that calls for the doctrinal modification traditionally
characterizing both the common law process of constitutional interpretation in general and the law of personal
jurisdiction in particular.”).
94. See supra Part I.A.
95. See, e.g., Williams v. Preeminent Protective Servs., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 265, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(finding personal jurisdiction with remote work); Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL
11707630, at *3–12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016) (same); Winner v. Tryko Partners, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 250, 256
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (same); Ouellette v. True Penny People, LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 144, 155 (D. Mass. 2018)
(same); Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC, 359 F. Supp. 3d 499, 513 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (same); Stuart v. Churn LLC, No.
1:19-CV-369, 2019 WL 2342354, at *6 (M.D.N.C. June 3, 2019) (same); King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp.
3d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2019) (same); Liqui-Box Corp. v. Scholle IPN Corp., No. 19 C 4069, 2020 WL 5593755, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020) (same); Wallens v. Milliman Fin. Risk Mgmt. LLC, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1215–
16 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (same).
96. See, e.g., Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding no personal jurisdiction with
remote work); Fields v. Sickle Cell Disease Ass’n of Am., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d 647, 652–54 (E.D.N.C.
2018), aff’d, 770 F. App’x 77 (4th Cir. 2019) (same); TorcUP, Inc. v. Aztec Bolting Servs., Inc., 386 F. Supp.
3d 520, 526–27 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (same); Pederson v. Frost, 951 F.3d 977, 980 (8th Cir. 2020) (same); Perry v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of U.S., No. CV TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 5759766, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020)
(same); Gonzalez v. U.S. Hum. Rts. Network, 512 F. Supp. 3d 944, 958–59 (D. Ariz. 2021) (same).
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when employers sue their remote employees, some courts have exercised
jurisdiction.97 Before exercising jurisdiction over former remote employees, one
court noted in dicta the increase in remote work “particularly during COVID-19
migration.”98 Another found that, even before the pandemic, “[t]he recent
increase in employees working out of their homes at some distance from their
employers’ business locations has presented novel issues for courts considering
personal jurisdiction.”99 This court applied a “fact-specific” analysis that
“require[d] a close examination of the intended relationship between the
parties”100 and ultimately found that it could exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant employer.101 In addition, one court exercised personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who sent malware to devices using the plaintiff’s system.102
Other courts refused to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who sent mass
emails and who used plaintiffs’ trademark in emailed newsletters,
respectively.103 Computer hacking was enough to find jurisdiction in one case.104
In another, some tweets gave rise to personal jurisdiction, while others did not.105
And one court found that out-of-state actions gave rise to personal jurisdiction,
where those actions “were a response to the breakdown of a . . . relationship”
based out of the forum state.106 These varied analyses and outcomes show the
need for a unified approach.
Moreover, courts tend to discount virtual contacts in their entirety,
determining jurisdiction by looking at physical contacts alone.107 Even when
97. See, e.g., Vizant Techs., LLC v. Whitchurch, 97 F. Supp. 3d 618, 630–31 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding
personal jurisdiction over remote employees); Numeric Analytics, LLC v. McCabe, 161 F. Supp. 3d 348, 356
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (same for some claims); ScaleMP, Inc. v. TidalScale, Inc., No. 18-cv-04716-EDL, 2019 WL
7877939, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (same); Bride Ministries, NFP v. DeMaster, No. 4:20-CV-00402, 2020
WL 6822836, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2020) (same); M3 USA Corp. v. Hart, 516 F. Supp. 3d 476, 493–98
(E.D. Penn. 2021) (same for most claims).
98. M3 USA, 516 F. Supp. 3d at 483 (recognizing the increase in remote work “particularly during COVID19 migration” and finding personal jurisdiction over remote employees).
99. Stuart, 2019 WL 2342354, at *3.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *6.
102. See, e.g., WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Grp. Tech. Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 649, 673–78 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(finding personal jurisdiction with malware sent using plaintiff’s system).
103. See, e.g., XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 850 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding no personal
jurisdiction with mass emails); Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2017)
(finding no personal jurisdiction with emailed newsletters).
104. See, e.g., Christie v. Nat’l Inst. for Newman Studs., 258 F. Supp. 3d 494, 507 (D.N.J. 2017) (finding
personal jurisdiction with computer hacking).
105. See, e.g., Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 859–64 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (finding
personal jurisdiction with some tweets but not others).
106. Clean Coal Tech., Inc. v. Leidos, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 3d 303, 313–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding personal
jurisdiction with out-of-state actions that “were a response to the breakdown of a New York-based relationship”).
107. The Supreme Court recently suggested at least a preference for physical contacts in the forum state.
See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (explicitly requiring
“principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State”) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); see also Trammell &
Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1129 (arguing “that courts should dispense with the fiction that purely virtual
conduct creates any meaningful contact with a particular forum”).

April 2022

DROPPING THE OTHER SHOE

881

courts look at virtual contacts, they tend to place less import on them than on
physical contacts.108 This effect may be the result of courts viewing virtual
contacts as less meaningful—or more puzzling—than physical contacts.
However, as the vast increase in remote-technology use in the pandemic and
post-pandemic worlds shows,109 virtual contacts can create connections that are
just as meaningful as physical contacts. Courts, in the personal jurisdiction
analysis, should treat them as such.
While the Supreme Court has not spoken decisively on the Internet in the
personal jurisdiction analysis,110 it has shown interest in resolving the matter.111
In its most recent personal jurisdiction case, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth
Judicial District Court,112 the Court addressed the Internet’s role in the personal
jurisdiction analysis, despite the fact that the case did not turn on Internet
contacts.113 Specifically, during oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts posed a
hypothetical about “a retired guy in a small town up in Maine who carves
decoys” and whose friends encourage him to sell them on the Internet.114 The
Chief Justice wondered if this decoy seller can “be sued in any state if some
harm arises from the decoy? You know, say it—you know, it has lead paint or
something. By putting something . . . an advertisement on the Internet, is he
exposing himself to suit anywhere in the country?”115 The majority responded
to the Chief Justice’s question in a footnote: “The differences between that case
108. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering related
non-Internet contacts, in addition to analysis of the Internet contacts, in the personal jurisdiction inquiry); Groop
Internet Platform Inc. v. Psychotherapy Action Network, No. CV 19-1854 (BAH), 2020 WL 353861, at *7
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (requiring a showing of “‘substantial’ non-internet contacts” in addition to Internet
contacts); see also Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1173 (“Many lower courts already recognize that
Internet activity, by itself, is ambiguous for purposes of determining the propriety of personal jurisdiction. Thus,
they already take account of non-Internet, physical contacts.”).
109. See supra Part I.B.
110. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at *11, *39–40, *47–48, *55–57, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (No. 19-368), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2020/19-368_m648.pdf (showing Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito,
and Justice Gorsuch posing hypotheticals involving the Internet and personal jurisdiction); Transcript of Oral
Argument at *17–18, *61, Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (No. 12-574), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2013/12-574_cb48.pdf (showing Justice Sotomayor’s questions about
whether and how the Internet may be implicated in the personal jurisdiction analysis); Transcript of Oral
Argument at *53, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (No. 09-1343),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/09-1343.pdf
(“JUSTICE
BREYER: . . . then . . . everyone with an Internet site who also sells to a buyer who says anywhere in the world,
perhaps—I don’t know how far that reaches—seems pretty filled with implications.”).
112. 141 S. Ct. 1017.
113. See id. at 1028 n.4 (“[W]e do not here consider internet transactions, which may raise doctrinal
questions of their own . . . . The differences between [the Internet-based hypothetical posed in oral argument]
and the ones before us virtually list themselves. (Just consider all our descriptions of Ford’s activities outside its
home bases.) So we agree with the plaintiffs’ counsel that resolving these cases does not also resolve the
hypothetical.”).
114. Transcript of Oral Argument at *39, Ford, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (No. 19-368),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-368_m648.pdf.
115. Id.
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and the ones before us virtually list themselves. (Just consider all our
descriptions of Ford’s activities outside its home bases.) So we agree with the
plaintiffs’ counsel that resolving these cases does not also resolve the
hypothetical.”116 But Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence arrived at a different
answer—or rather, more questions:
The majority says this hypothetical supplies a useful study in contrast with our
cases. On the majority’s telling, Ford’s “continuous” contacts with Montana
and Minnesota are enough to establish an “affiliation” with those States; by
comparison, the decoy seller’s contacts may be too “isolated” and “sporadic”
to entitle an injured buyer to sue in his home State. But if this comparison
highlights anything, it is only the litigation sure to follow. For between the
poles of “continuous” and “isolated” contacts lie a virtually infinite number of
“affiliations” waiting to be explored. And when it comes to that vast terrain,
the majority supplies no meaningful guidance about what kind or how much
of an “affiliation” will suffice. Nor, once more, does the majority tell us
whether its new affiliation test supplants or merely supplements the old
causation inquiry.117

These considerations reiterate the lack of a consensus and clear answer to, not
only the Chief Justice’s hypothetical, but also the broader question of how to
approach personal jurisdiction in the Internet age.
Adding to this uncertainty, some Justices, in separate concurring opinions,
questioned International Shoe’s position as personal jurisdiction’s guiding
star.118 The majority, however, rejected these arguments and “resolve[d] these
cases by proceeding as the Court has done for the last 75 years—applying the
standards set out in International Shoe and its progeny, with attention to their
underlying values of ensuring fairness and protecting interstate federalism.”119
In short, the question of how to analyze virtual activities, including whether
International Shoe is up to the task, is on the Justices’ minds, highly relevant,
and ready for resolution.
116. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4.
117. Id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch then wondered whether International Shoe
should resolve the Chief Justice’s hypothetical:
Perhaps this is the real reason why the majority introduces us to the hypothetical decoy salesman.
Yes, he arguably availed himself of a new market. Yes, the plaintiff’s injuries arguably arose from
(or were caused by) the product he sold there. Yes, International Shoe’s old causation test would
seemingly allow for personal jurisdiction. But maybe the majority resists that conclusion because the
old test no longer seems as reliable a proxy for determining corporate presence as it once did.
Maybe that’s the intuition lying behind the majority’s introduction of its new “affiliation” rule and
its comparison of the Maine retiree’s “sporadic” and “isolated” sales in the plaintiff’s State and Ford’s
deep “relationships” and “connections” with Montana and Minnesota.
Id. at 1038 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring) (“T]here are grounds for questioning the standard that the Court
adopted in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, . . . . And there are also reasons to wonder whether the case
law we have developed since that time is well suited for the way in which business is now conducted.”); id. at
1036 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“With the old International Shoe dichotomy looking increasingly uncertain, it’s
hard not to ask how we got here and where we might be headed.”).
119. Id. at 1025 n.2.
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What, then, to make of these indecisive, scattered, and sometimes
conflicting cases? A simple, though insufficient, answer is that, in some cases
involving virtual contacts, some courts may find personal jurisdiction, and in
other cases, other courts may not. In other words, there seems to be case-by-case
consideration of virtual contacts but without clear guiding principles for future
courts to follow. This is no answer for the out-of-state virtual actor who wants
predictability, the litigants who want to either get to the merits or quickly dispose
of their case, or the curious law student. As the preceding Parts have shown,120
the issue of technology in the personal jurisdiction analysis is not only misguided
and lacking a clear consensus but also becoming increasingly important as the
reliance on remote technology increases. Currently, there is no lodestar approach
to the problem of virtual contacts in the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and an
answer is long overdue.
II. FLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
DOCTRINES AS A SOLUTION
This Note argues that the existing frameworks for personal jurisdiction are
flexible enough to accommodate even the broad set of technological innovations
that permeate social and commercial relationships. The problem is, as shown
above,121 that courts have not treated personal jurisdiction as flexible and
evolving. Rather, they have hewed to a physical-based approach and relegated
Internet contacts to a separate, quickly outdated test, all of which has led to
confusion when confronted with virtual contacts and remote technology. The
reality is that virtual contacts support the exercise of personal jurisdiction on the
same and even surer footing as physical contacts, which can lead to a more
updated, uniform, and coherent doctrine. Virtual contacts can support personal
jurisdiction in three areas of the doctrine: minimum contacts, general notions of
fairness, and the fairness factors.
A. MINIMUM CONTACTS
Virtual contacts should count towards minimum contacts on the same
footing as physical contacts. Courts can analyze virtual contacts just as they
would physical contacts: out-of-state defendants can purposefully avail
themselves and seek and obtain the benefits and protection of forum states
through virtual contacts, causes of action can arise out of or relate to virtual
activities, and it can be reasonably foreseeable that defendants would be haled
into court in a forum state by virtue of their virtual contacts. This approach
accords with the flexibility inherent in the minimum contacts test.

120. See supra Parts I.A. and I.B.
121. See supra Parts I.A. and I.C.
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1. Current Doctrine and Development
When there is no consent, citizenship, or in-state service of the out-of-state
defendant, the test for exercising personal jurisdiction is the “minimum
contacts” test.122 Under this test, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a
defendant that has “minimum contacts” with the forum state.123 This test is not
“mechanical or quantitative,” and “[w]hether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure.”124 The contacts on which personal jurisdiction has
been based were often, though need not be, physical.125 Despite their lack of
physical form, virtual contacts can and should fit into this test.
Through several cases, the Supreme Court has developed the minimum
contacts test to include several considerations: a defendant’s “purposeful[]
avail[ment]” of the forum state,126 the “benefits and protection” that a defendant
sought and obtained from the forum state,127 causes of action that “arise out of
or relate to” contacts with the forum state,128 and the reasonable foreseeability
122. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 319.
125. From early on, “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction [was] physical power . . . .” McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 90, 91 (1917). As the doctrine developed, the notions of physical power and physical connection as
foundational aspects of personal jurisdiction remained. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619
(1990) (“[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the
continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’ That standard was developed by analogy to ‘physical presence,’ and it would be perverse
to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of jurisdiction.”). However, the Court has clarified that the
contacts need not be physical to satisfy the minimum contacts test. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Jurisdiction . . . may not be avoided merely because the defendant did
not physically enter the forum State.”).
126. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319); J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (“[I]t is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction
consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (“[The contacts] must show that the defendant deliberately
‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State or entering a
contractual relationship centered there.”) (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)).
127. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in
most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”); see, e.g., Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1029 (“In conducting so much business
in Montana and Minnesota, Ford ‘enjoys the benefits and protection of [their] laws’—the enforcement of
contracts, the defense of property, the resulting formation of effective markets.”) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
319).
128. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780
(2017)); see also Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“[S]o far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
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that a defendant would be haled into court in the forum state.129 The Supreme
Court has also emphasized that it is the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
that matter, not the plaintiff’s.130 These factors permit consideration of virtual
contacts in the minimum contacts analysis.
The minimum contacts test is flexible enough to encompass virtual
contacts. Since its announcement in International Shoe, this test has permitted
non-physical ties to the forum state to give rise to personal jurisdiction.131 By
announcing the test in broad terms, the Court left open the possibility that
“minimum contacts” could mean even those modes of contact that did not exist
at the time of its inception.132 Thus, applying the minimum contacts test can
seem like “a black art.”133 However, the benefit of a broad standard is its
flexibility and applicability to an ever-evolving society. Furthermore, the
assumptions underlying the minimum contacts test are grounded in this

activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce
them can, in most cases, hardly be said to be undue.”); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty
of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal
jurisdiction.”); Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (2017) (“In order for a court to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’”) (alteration in original) (citing
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
129. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[T]he foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”); Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 903 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and other legal entities, ushered in
by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness.”).
130. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (“[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’
creates with the forum State . . . . Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the
liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”) (citing Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475).
131. In particular, courts and scholars view International Shoe as stepping away from a requirement of
physical contacts and towards the possibility of other types of contacts. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (“As International Shoe suggests, the defendant’s litigation-related “minimum
contacts” may take the place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdiction[.]”); Terry S. Kogan, A NeoFederalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CALIF. L. REV. 257, 352 (1990) (“Thus, the Court did not
abandon Pennoyer’s requirement of presence, but merely said that the concept must be renovated to suit the
circumstances of modern society. Physical presence was replaced by minimum contacts.”); Kendrick D.
Nguyen, Note, Redefining the Threshold for Personal Jurisdiction: Contact and the Presumption of Fairness,
83 B.U. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003) (“International Shoe affirms that [physical] presence is no longer necessary to
‘validate novel, non-traditional assertions of jurisdiction . . . .’”) (quoting Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619).
132. See, e.g., Christopher W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around
the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269, 1329–30 (1997) (“Constitutional application of
the minimum contacts test demands that courts retain the flexibility to exercise personal jurisdiction over those
defendants who purposefully avail themselves of the forum, while denying requests for jurisdiction over
defendants whose advertisements fortuitously reach the forum.”).
133. Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1109 (1996).
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flexibility of meaningful contacts and fairness.134 Therefore, a flexible standard
comports with the test’s origins and with due process.135
Additionally, virtual contacts are not different enough from physical
contacts to warrant a new test. In fact, virtual contacts are qualitatively similar
to the physical contacts that currently satisfy the minimum contacts test. Virtual
activities “involve real people in one territorial jurisdiction either (i) transacting
with real people in other territorial jurisdictions or (ii) engaging in activity in
one jurisdiction that causes real-world effects in another territorial
jurisdiction.”136 While the technology that creates these activities is new and
different, the substance and effects of the activities can be the same as those of
physical activities. Moreover, the effects of out-of-state conduct that are felt in
the forum state can be just as significant as the effects of conduct that occurred

134. See Ryne H. Ballou, Note, Civil Procedure—Be More Specific: Vague Precedents and the Differing
Standards by Which to Apply “Arises Out of or Relates to” in the Test for Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 35 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 663, 685 (2013) (noting the “flexibility” of the minimum contacts test and arguing
that the “primary purpose” of the test is “to ensure fairness”). It is therefore not true that “the network’s structural
indifference to geographic position is incongruous with the fundamental assumptions underlying the
International Shoe test.” Burk, supra note 133, at 1109. Geography and territorial connection, after all, lost their
rigid applicability to the personal jurisdiction analysis when International Shoe replaced Pennoyer v. Neff as the
seminal personal jurisdiction case. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 45, § 1067 (“The new ‘field theory’ established by International Shoe held out the
possibility that notions of territoriality and state sovereignty would disappear entirely from the analysis of
personal jurisdiction questions, opening the doors to nationwide service of process limited only by the
requirements of ‘minimum contacts’ and ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”); William M.
Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 599 (1993) (“[I]n International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, the Court rejected the rigid territorialism of Pennoyer v. Neff . . . .”); Wesley M. Bernhardt, Note,
A Clash of Principles: Personal Jurisdiction and Two-Level Utilitarianism in the Information Age, 11 WASH.
U. JURIS. REV. 113, 135 (2018) (“Personal jurisdiction doctrine has not remained static over time. Instead, the
doctrine has evolved from a rigid formula to the relatively more flexible doctrine exhibited by International
Shoe and its progeny.”). But see Richman, supra, at 613 (arguing that “the contacts requirement is simply a
vestige of the Court’s territorial power theory and has no modern, functional justification”).
135. “The ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry is ‘flexible.’” N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner
1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019). This inherent flexibility helps the inquiry conform with the Due
Process Clause. See Michael E. Allen, Note, Analyzing Minimum Contacts Through the Internet: Should the
World Wide Web Mean World Wide Jurisdiction?, 31 IND. L. REV. 385, 411 (1998) (“[C]ertain adaptations of
the minimum contacts test, if applied properly, are capable of fairly and efficiently handling jurisdictional issues
involving the Internet . . . . [W]hen a court focuses on the defendant’s contacts with the forum through the
Internet, personal jurisdiction decisions are much more likely to comport with the requirements of the Due
Process Clause. By contrast, when a court becomes sidetracked and focuses on the boundless limits of the
Internet, the defendant’s due process rights will often be lost in the confusion.”).
However, Justice Gorsuch remains curious about the original meaning of the Due Process Clause and
its role in the personal jurisdiction analysis. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *28–29, *56–57, Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (No. 19-368), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2020/19-368_m648.pdf (showing Justice Gorsuch twice asking about the
original meaning of the Due Process Clause).
136. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1239–40 (1998); see also TiTi
Nguyen, Note, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539–40 (2004) (“[F]or the purposes of determining minimum contacts, activities
conducted via the Internet are no different than activities conducted in real space . . . . Since cyberspace does not
exist separate and apart from the physical world, traditional personal jurisdiction tests are not so outmoded that
they cannot be applied to the Internet.”).
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in the forum state.137 Forum states then must be able to protect their citizens from
harmful effects intentionally directed at the forum state, even if the conduct
giving rise to the harm originated in a different forum.138 Virtual activities are
therefore “functionally identical” in both substance and effect to other interstate
activities that have traditionally given rise to personal jurisdiction, including
“mail or telephone or smoke signal.”139
Of course, virtual contacts in the modern world are also different from
contacts arising from mail, telephone, and smoke signal. For example, unlike
physical contacts, virtual contacts lack clear boundaries.140 As a result, it is
difficult to determine which virtual contacts give rise to personal jurisdiction and
which do not.141 Virtual contacts can also arise from activity all over the world
in much greater numbers than physical contacts do.142 These differences and
complications with virtual contacts, however, do not require a new test. Even
the long-accepted physical contacts analysis was never so simple.143 Rather, the
personal jurisdiction inquiry has always required a case-by-case analysis and has
always evaded an easy test.144 The wrinkle that virtual contacts add therefore
137. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (holding that “[j]urisdiction over petitioners
is . . . proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California”).
138. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984) (finding that “New Hampshire has
clearly expressed its interest in protecting such persons from libel, as well as in safeguarding its populace from
falsehoods” and that this interest is sufficient to find jurisdiction).
139. Goldsmith, supra note 136, at 1240.
140. See Digit. Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) (“[A]s far as
the Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is everywhere where there is
Internet access.”); see also Adam R. Kleven, Note, Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for Specific
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 116 MICH. L. REV. 785, 787 (2018) (“The internet has blurred territorial lines.
Originally, the jurisdictional question was answered by the territorial power of a sovereign state, which was
deemed to have jurisdiction over all persons and things within its geographic boundary. But changes in
commerce and technology have challenged prior conceptions of territory and accompanying jurisdictional rules.
More recent changes raise a new jurisdictional question: When a user engages in activity online, where is that
activity occurring?”); Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in A World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (1997)
(“[T]he advent of global computer networks has rendered geographic boundaries increasingly porous and
ephemeral.”).
141. This idea, along with the question of how to fit virtual contacts into the analysis that naturally follows,
is the crux of the puzzling question of virtual contacts in the personal jurisdiction analysis. See supra Part I.C.
142. See Zoe Niesel, #personaljurisdiction: A New Age of Internet Contacts, 94 IND. L.J. 103, 104 (2019)
(“Difficulties in applying personal jurisdiction are manifest—the internet does not respect territorial boundaries,
is accessible anytime and anyplace, and allows users from all parts of the globe to access and contribute.”).
143. The subject of complaint of many first-year law students, personal jurisdiction is notoriously complex:
Issues regarding personal jurisdiction have tortured law students and practitioners alike; the topic
and its bag of rhetoric, including such phrases as “fundamental fairness,” “minimum contacts,” and
“purposeful availment,” often amount to no more than an ad hoc judgment that the law attempts to
implement as a post hoc black letter rule, to ensure that similar factual circumstances command the
same “fair” result.
Richard S. Zembek, Note, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of
Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 366–67 (1996). Indeed, “[c]yberspace has further clouded the
jurisdictional inquiry by obscuring the fundamental questions of who? what? and where?” Id. at 367. However,
it is clear that the personal jurisdiction analysis has always been somewhat cloudy.
144. See, for example, the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence from International Shoe to
the present, which includes individual assessment of contacts. Even as it avoided cases with virtual contacts, the
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does not render unworkable the existing frameworks.145 Virtual contacts fit
within the same, flexible minimum contacts test because they are substantially
similar to the physical contacts that have required individualized consideration
and nuanced analysis from courts and first-year law students alike.
2. Application in the Remote-Technology Context
As remote technology becomes more widespread, virtual contacts
increasingly resemble the physical contacts that currently satisfy the minimum
contacts test. These virtual contacts establish connection between the out-ofstate defendant and the forum state, even in the absence of physical contact, as
out-of-state defendant technology-users purposefully avail themselves of the
forum state and seek and obtain its benefits and protection. Causes of action can
also arise out of or relate to virtual contacts with the forum state. It is reasonably
foreseeable that these defendants might be haled into court in this state. Virtual
contacts also increase the overall number of contacts defendants have with a
particular forum state, adding to the analysis. New technology therefore does not
require a new test. Rather, virtual contacts fit within the existing minimum
contacts test.
a. The Defendant’s Purposeful Availment of the Forum State
Out-of-state defendants who engage in virtual activities may purposefully
avail themselves of the forum state when they direct their activities towards that
state.146 This purposeful availment can include virtual activities directly aimed
at a particular forum state or individual in a forum state147 as well as the
Supreme Court has decided many personal jurisdiction cases since establishing its current, difficult-to-apply test.
These cases include, among others, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984), Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985), Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), Burnham v.
Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011),
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct.
1773 (2017), and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
145. Technology and the Internet are not so foreign to personal jurisdiction’s traditional frameworks to
render these frameworks unusable. See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir.
2002), overruled by Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“‘Cyberspace,’
however, is not some mystical incantation capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts built from bricks and
mortar. Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdiction have proven adaptable to other changes in the
national economy, so too are they adaptable to the transformations wrought by the Internet.”).
146. When a defendant’s “efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, [the Supreme
Court] ha[s] consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction
there.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
147. See, e.g., Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2016) (finding personal jurisdiction because the virtual contacts, which included email, phone, and text, were
“direct . . . contacts,” “for the purpose of Plaintiff performing work for the benefit of Defendants,” and
“deliberate actions on the part of Defendants purposely directed” at the forum state); Wallens v. Milliman Fin.
Risk Mgmt. LLC, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding personal jurisdiction because the virtual
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knowledge or intent that the activities will or may give rise to harm in a forum
state.148 Purposeful availment “ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’
contacts.”149 Just like with physical contacts, therefore, virtual contacts will not
always reach this standard.150 Only the virtual contacts that reach this standard
will result in a finding of personal jurisdiction. Purposeful availment therefore
supplies a functional standard by which to measure virtual contacts and to
include them in the minimum contacts analysis.
In particular, some lower courts have found that hiring and enlisting the
services of a remote worker purposefully avails an employer of the worker’s
forum due to meaningful remote contacts such as recruiting the worker,
negotiating the employment contract, and maintaining a close business
relationship with the worker through email, telephone, and snail mail.151
Additional virtual contacts, such as Zoom contacts in the remote-technology
era,152 could similarly evince purposeful availment and satisfy the minimum
contacts test as these activities increasingly take place over Zoom and as
employers use Zoom to establish meaningful and purposeful connections with
their remote employees.
In its own words, Zoom “provide[s] a video-first communications platform
that delivers happiness and fundamentally changes how people interact. [Zoom]
connect[s] people through frictionless video, voice, chat and content sharing and
enable[s] face-to-face video experiences for thousands of people in a single

contacts were “direct” with the plaintiff, “directed toward” the forum state, and “for the purpose of [plaintiff]
performing work for the benefit of Defendants”).
148. See, e.g., Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F. Supp. 3d 850, 861 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (finding that
defendant’s tweet “was intended to cause some action in Michigan or catch the eye of those most able to make
contact with the [plaintiffs], i.e., Michiganders” and therefore concluding that the “tweet was contact with
Michigan that satisfie[d] the constitutional minimum”).
149. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
150. In these cases, just like with physical contacts, personal jurisdiction is properly denied. See, e.g.,
Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that
defendant’s “incidental [virtual] contacts” with the forum state “[did] not constitute a ‘deliberate’ and
‘substantial connection’ with the state such that [defendant] could ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there’”).
151. See, e.g., King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15 (D. Mass. 2019); Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC,
359 F. Supp. 3d 499, 510 (E.D. Ky. 2019); Ouellette v. True Penny People, LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 144, 154 (D.
Mass. 2018); Williams v. Preeminent Protective Servs., Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 265, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
152. Zoom has become the go-to remote-technology tool with which remote workers and other users have
become familiar during the pandemic and will likely continue to use post-pandemic. See Maria Armental, Zoom
Foresees Robust Growth Even as Pandemic Pressures Ease, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2021, 6:36 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/zoom-foresees-robust-growth-even-as-pandemic-pressures-ease-11614637492
(“Zoom Video Communications Inc. said its growth would continue at a rapid pace amid the vaccine rollout,
after pandemic lockdowns turned the company into a household name and an investor darling.”). The same
applies to other videoconferencing platforms as well. See supra notes 66–92 and accompanying text (arguing
that the reliance on remote technology for remote work and other aspects of remote life will continue in the postpandemic world).
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meeting across disparate devices and locations.”153 Zoom and other
videoconferencing platforms “bring[] people together wherever they are,
mimicking the nuances of face-to-face interactions in a convenient, digital
space.”154 By offering technology that permits individuals to virtually meet,
interact, and conduct business in substantially the same manner as in-person
meetings, Zoom allows employers and other remote-technology users to connect
with individuals in other locations, including in other states. These users then
“Zoom” into other states and purposefully avail themselves of those other states
through their virtual connections. Zoom, along with other videoconferencing
tools, is therefore functionally like existing teleconferencing tools and in-person
interactions, and they should be seen on the same footing as earlier technologies
and physical contacts. After all, Zoom aims to “make Zoom meetings better
than”—and functionally similar to—“in-person meetings”155 and even more
personal than earlier forms of meaningful remote contacts such as email,
telephone, or snail mail.
b. The Benefits and Protection That a Defendant Seeks and Obtains
of the Forum State
Similarly, remote-technology users seek out and use the benefits and
protection of the forum state when their use of such technology allows them to
connect with and benefit from the connection in that state.156 These benefits and
protection can include, among other things, “the enforcement of contracts, the
defense of property, [and] the resulting formation of effective markets.”157 Just
as the International Shoe Company benefited from its employees’ sales in the
forum state in International Shoe,158 the remote-technology user benefits from
connection with others—whether for work, social, or malicious purposes—in
the forum state through the use of remote technology. With the remote worker,
for example, the defendant employer seeks out and obtains the benefit of having
the remote worker in the forum state and reaping the fruits of the worker’s

153. Our Goal Is to Make Zoom Meetings Better Than In-Person Meetings, ZOOM: INV. RELS.
https://investors.zoom.us/static-files/f74354f8-d7de-46fa-a519-c41d6733886a (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
Despite Zoom’s aims, many have discovered the ways in which Zoom differs from in-person
interactions. See Stephen Noonoo, Is Learning on Zoom the Same as In Person? Not to Your Brain, EDSURGE
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.edsurge.com/news/2020-09-15-is-learning-on-zoom-the-same-as-in-person-notto-your-brain (“[P]eople began realizing that all these video calls were making them tired—exhausted even—
more so than a day of in-person class or all-day meetings. The phenomena [sic] even has a name: Zoom
fatigue.”). For better or worse, however, the use of the technology will likely not end when the pandemic does,
and the virtual connections may constitute purposeful availment of the state into which the individual “Zooms.”
154. Rob Scott, Must Have Video Conferencing Statistics 2020, UC TODAY (July 27, 2020),
https://www.uctoday.com/collaboration/video-conferencing/video-conferencing-statistics.
155. Our Goal Is to Make Zoom Meetings Better Than In-Person Meetings, supra note 153.
156. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (stating that “to the extent that a
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of
the laws of that state”).
157. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1029 (2021).
158. 326 U.S. at 320.
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labor.159 Even though it is the plaintiff remote worker who has the strongest
contacts with the forum state, the defendant employer still seeks and obtains
these benefits and protection by virtue of its own close contacts and relationship
with its remote worker.160 These benefits, despite the defendant’s physical
location, “create[] reciprocal obligations.”161 Requiring these remotetechnology users to defend suits in the forum state, therefore, can “hardly be said
to be undue.”162
c. A Cause of Action That Arises Out of or Relates to Contacts With
the Forum State
Additionally, just as with physical contacts, remote activities that give rise
or relate to a cause of action can support a finding of jurisdiction. The “relate to”
prong of the “arise out of or relate to” standard “contemplates that some
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”163 While
“[t]hat does not mean anything goes[,]”164 this relation need not derive from
physical contacts—virtual contacts may also provide bases for causes of action
in or relation to the forum state.165
While this inquiry will depend on the particular virtual contacts and causes
of action involved, courts have found causes of action that relate to virtual
contacts with the forum state. For example, some courts found that employmentrelated causes of action related to employers’ virtual contacts with their remote
worker’s forum state.166 Contract and tort claims also related to an employer’s
159. See, e.g., Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2016) (finding that the “virtual contacts were for the purpose of Plaintiff performing work for the benefit of
Defendants, and Defendants knew that Plaintiff was performing the work in California”); Wallens v. Milliman
Fin. Risk Mgmt. LLC, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (similar).
160. See, e.g., King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15 (D. Mass. 2019) (finding that, although the
plaintiff’s request to work remotely was for his own benefit, the defendants “nonetheless purposefully and
intentionally engaged with” the plaintiff through its virtual contacts and concluding that “[s]uch conduct cannot
reasonably be described as involuntary or unilateral”).
161. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030.
162. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
163. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. But see id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is apparent that ‘arise out of’
and ‘relate to’ overlap and are not really two discrete grounds for jurisdiction. The phrase ‘arise out of or relate
to’ is simply a way of restating the basic ‘minimum contacts’ standard adopted in International Shoe.”).
164. Id. at 1026. In fact,
[i]n the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase “relate to” incorporates real limits, as it must to
adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again, we have never framed the specific
jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came
about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.
Id.
165. Further, the “relate to” prong may take on an increased importance in the virtual world as conduct
giving rise to a cause of action in the remote-technology era will often include related virtual activities. However,
without yet seeing how lower courts will interpret and apply Ford, this result is not certain.
166. See, e.g., Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26,
2016) (finding that employer’s virtual contacts “entailed numerous deliberate contacts by Defendants with
California related to [Plaintiff’s] employment claims”); King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15 (D.
Mass. 2019) (finding that “plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages arises directly from the contacts of the Corporate
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virtual contacts.167 Ultimately, the inquiry is more focused on the relation
between the contacts and the cause of action than on the physical location of the
harm or the physical presence of the defendant.168 In fact, “[t]he proper question
is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether
the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”169 The
focus of this inquiry and the Court’s recent explanation of the separate “relate
to” prong suggest that, where a sufficient connection exists, virtual contacts can
give rise and relate to a cause of action and thus provide the basis for jurisdiction
in that forum state, just as physical contacts can.170
d. The Reasonable Foreseeability That a Defendant Will Be Haled
Into Court in the Forum State
It is also reasonably foreseeable that a remote-technology user’s virtual
activities may cause harm in another state. Accordingly, it is reasonably
foreseeable that this user may be haled into court in this state. Even though the
law is disjointed on this point,171 the possibility of having to answer a lawsuit
based on virtual causes of action is foreseeable because reasonable people today
generally know that their actions may give rise to legal consequences regardless
of state boundaries. Generally, their understanding of this concept is not
contingent on territorial lines.172 Additionally and importantly, reasonable

Defendants with [plaintiff] and, as a result, with Massachusetts”); Wallens v. Milliman Fin. Risk Mgmt. LLC,
509 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that “several of [Plaintiff]’s claims against [Defendant]
arise out of [Defendant]’s contact with” the forum state).
167. See, e.g., Ouellette v. True Penny People, LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 144, 153 (D. Mass. 2018) (finding that
the contract and tort claims were “based on, and causally linked to, the same underlying conduct by Defendant”).
168. “The relatedness inquiry ‘serves the important function of focusing the court’s attention on the nexus
between a plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” Id. at 152 (citation omitted).
169. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014) (emphasis added).
170. Though it does not contemplate virtual contacts, International Shoe states the proposition broadly. See
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“[S]o far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most cases, hardly be said to be undue.”). But see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (explicitly requiring “‘principally, [an] activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
171. See supra Parts I.A. and I.C.
172. Society’s view today and in the future involves a national perspective, rather than a perspective limited
by state borders, particularly in the virtual world. See JANNA ANDERSON, KATHLEEN STANSBERRY & LEE RAINIE,
PEW RSCH. CTR., EXPERTS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE NEXT 50 YEARS OF DIGITAL LIFE 77 (2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2019/10/PI_2019.10.28_The-Next-50-Yearsof-Digital-Life_FINAL.pdf (“[T]here will not be as many borders as today; this new information society is a
society with flexible borders.”).
Some scholars have considered the role of this nationalized perspective in the personal jurisdiction
analysis and development. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell, Personal Jurisdiction and National Sovereignty, 77
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97, 100 (2020) (arguing that the personal jurisdiction analysis “should take into account
that states are members of a shared sovereignty,” “rather than looking at states as unconnected sovereigns”);
Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent Formalist
Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 824–25 (1991) (noting that “[t]he United States moved inexorably
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people today know that technology is widely used173 and therefore may
increasingly view connections arising out of such technology as tantamount to
physical connections. They are also aware of technology’s ability to extend an
individual’s reach,174 including an individual’s ability to use technology to cause
harm in faraway places.175
Just as with in-person meetings, for example, individuals in Zoom meetings
may subject themselves to employment discrimination claims,176 privacy
claims,177 or even criminal charges for the intrusive “Zoombomber.”178 It would
toward social, economic, and political unity” and that “International Shoe . . . w[as] [a] manifestation[] of the
new legal thinking and should be seen in this context”).
173. “Technology has infiltrated every aspect of our lives[.]” The Role of Technology, KNIGHT FOUND.,
https://knightfoundation.org/digitalcitizenship/technology (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
174. Technology allows people to connect with others all over the world:
Telecommunication systems are a very crucial part of any advanced society. From using bird
messages and smoke signals, to the faster, more efficient, more effective, and more global system of
email, phone calls, and app messaging allows for people to stay connected in a globalized world.
From Skype to VOIP to global telecom carriers, it is highly feasible for people to travel the world
and stay connected, and even possible for remote workers or international businesses to utilize video
calls and conference calls via the Internet to keep their businesses going without interruption.
D.J. Wardynski, Technology and Society: How Technology Changed Our Lives, BRAINSPIRE: BLOG (Oct. 24,
2019), https://www.brainspire.com/blog/technology-and-society-how-technology-changed-our-lives.
175. See Austen Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 104
(2019) (“Changes in technology, including the expansion of the internet, have meant localized conduct can have
far-reaching impact.”). For example, a lot of crime occurs over the Internet. In 2020, complaints of Internet
crime increased by sixty-nine percent. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTERNET CRIME REPORT 2020, at 3
(2021), https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2020_IC3Report.pdf (“In 2020, while the American
public was focused on protecting our families from a global pandemic and helping others in need, cyber criminals
took advantage of an opportunity to profit from our dependence on technology to go on an Internet crime spree.
These criminals used phishing, spoofing, extortion, and various types of Internet-enabled fraud to target the most
vulnerable in our society—medical workers searching for personal protective equipment, families looking for
information about stimulus checks to help pay bills, and many others.”).
176. See Steven Pearlman, Zoom Doom: Avoiding Liability and Embarrassment in the Virtual Workplace,
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenpearlman/2020/11/19/zoom-doomavoiding-liability-and-embarrassment-in-the-virtual-workplace/?sh=6ef032c8ebca (“Indeed, we could be
nearing an inflection point where behavior in the virtual meetings to which employees are adapting that may
seem just boorish may escalate and start to form the basis of new litigation.”).
177. Companies and employees that mishandle sensitive information, in particular, may face privacy claims.
See Jeffrey M. Stefan II, Health Crisis Puts Video Conferencing in the Spotlight – What to Know to Avoid Risk,
10 NAT’L L. REV. 1 (2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/health-crisis-puts-video-conferencingspotlight-what-to-know-to-avoid-risk. Relatedly, Zoom itself has faced lawsuits over privacy claims. See In re
Zoom Video Commc’ns Inc. Priv. Litig., 525 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (class action suit claiming
that “Zoom violated California law by (1) sharing Plaintiffs’ personally identifiable information with third
parties; (2) misstating Zoom’s security capabilities; and (3) failing to prevent security breaches known as
‘Zoombombing’”).
178. “Zoombombing”—the conduct of the “Zoombomber”—refers to “video-teleconference hijacking,” or
“the uninvited entry into and disruption of a videoconference call, often by means of obscene, hateful, or
threatening language or images. A compound drawing on the name of San Jose-based platform Zoom, the term
is colloquially applied to disruption carried out across videoconference platforms.” Rachel Bercovitz,
Prosecuting Zoom-Bombing, LAWFARE (Apr. 24, 2020, 10:42 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/prosecutingzoom-bombing.
Criminal charges quickly attached to “Zoombombing.” See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal,
State, and Local Law Enforcement Warn Against Teleconferencing Hacking During Coronavirus Pandemic
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/federal-state-and-local-law-enforcement-warn-against-
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be incongruous with reasonable expectations to conclude that defendants who
cause harm virtually should be free from a court’s reach by mere virtue of their
use of remote technology. In the remote-work context, the employer foresees
being haled into court in its remote worker’s state no less than it does for the
worker to whom it sends mail and occasionally visits.179 Even though “mere
knowledge” of an employee’s remote work in another state alone is not enough
to give rise to personal jurisdiction,180 defendant employers who have sufficient
contacts with their remote employees through their working relationship should
reasonably foresee that any harm they cause to their remote employee may result
in a lawsuit in the employee’s forum state. “As COVID-19 has now made clear,
the workplace is not limited to the physical building, plant, or office. It also
includes the broader environment that workers operate in—their home
environments as well as their work environments—and even the spaces and
coffee shops in between.”181 With this expansion in what constitutes the
workplace, employers should know that their potential liability extends beyond
the office building, even to remote workers’ forum states. The defendant
employer then should reasonably foresee that it may be haled into its remote
employee’s forum state just as it may be for harm to an in-person employee.
Without a difference in the reasonable foreseeability of being haled into court,
virtual contacts should be viewed in the same manner as physical contacts.
***
Additionally, virtual contacts can increase the overall number of contacts
defendants have with a particular forum state. While some commentators doubt
that virtual contacts will ever be enough to satisfy the minimum contacts test,182
this doubt proves untrue. Some courts and commentators have argued, correctly,
that physical contacts are merely one way to satisfy the minimum contacts
test.183 In reality, the contacts that an out-of-state defendant has with a forum

teleconferencing-hacking-during; Bercovitz, supra; Nick Statt, ‘Zoombombing’ Is a Federal Offense that Could
Result in Imprisonment, Prosecutors Warn, THE VERGE (Apr. 3, 2020, 3:13 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/4/3/21207260/zoombombing-crime-zoom-video-conference-hacking-pranks-doj-fbi.
179. See supra Introduction (illustrating different jurisdictional results for a defendant employer sued by its
remote worker and by its worker that shares some physical contacts with the employer).
180. “In remote-work cases, . . . a defendant’s mere knowledge that an employee happens to reside in the
forum state and conduct some work from home does not constitute purposeful availment.” Perry v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders of U.S., No. CV TDC-20-0454, 2020 WL 5759766, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2020).
181. STEVE HATFIELD, NICOLE SCOBLE-WILLIAMS & ERICA VOLINI, DELOITTE, FROM SURVIVE TO THRIVE:
THE FUTURE OF WORK IN THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD 6 (2021), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/
Deloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/gx-the-future-of-work-post-covid-19-poc.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1129 (“We argue that courts should dispense with
the fiction that purely virtual conduct creates any meaningful contact with a particular forum.”).
183. See, e.g., uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 431 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he geographical
relationship between claim and contacts is only one facet of the constitutional inquiry.”); Pederson v. Frost, 951
F.3d 977, 980 (8th Cir. 2020) (“To be sure, ‘calls, emails, and text messages’ directed at a plaintiff can be
relevant contacts.”); Kogan, supra note 131, at 356 (“The requisite relationship between a valid forum and a

April 2022

DROPPING THE OTHER SHOE

895

state will often include a mix of physical and virtual contacts.184 The finding that
virtual contacts can be sufficient contacts on their own will only fortify the
minimum contacts analysis in these mixed-contacts cases, strengthening courts’
proper exercise of personal jurisdiction. Virtual contacts alone or in addition to
other contacts, therefore, can and should give rise to personal jurisdiction.
It is also not enough to say that including virtual contacts in the minimum
contacts analysis results in an overly expanded doctrine.185 While the number of
interstate contacts will likely rise, which will likely expand the personal
jurisdictional reach of each court, recent restrictions in the doctrine prevent it
from becoming an overly expanded doctrine. Recent trends from the Supreme
Court indicate a contraction of personal jurisdiction, as the Court has, case by
case, placed limits on the doctrine.186 Specifically, in J. McIntyre, Ltd. v.
Nicastro187 and Walden v. Fiore,188 the Court “tightened the required nexus
between the defendant and the forum in ways that reduce the range of plausible
litigation forums.”189 In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California,190 “the Court further narrowed specific jurisdiction by demanding a

defendant is significantly dephysicalized. In addition to the very physical notion of a ‘contact,’ the Court now
contemplates other, more ambiguous ‘ties or relations.’”); Nguyen, supra note 131, at 257 (“A defendant’s
presence in the forum is still sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, though International Shoe affirms that
such presence is no longer necessary to ‘validate novel, non-traditional assertions of jurisdiction . . . .’”) (quoting
Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)); see also supra notes 131–35 and accompanying
text (demonstrating that, from its inception, International Shoe has permitted non-physical contacts).
184. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering related
non-Internet contacts, in addition to analysis of the Internet contacts, in the personal jurisdiction inquiry); Groop
Internet Platform Inc. v. Psychotherapy Action Network, No. CV 19-1854 (BAH), 2020 WL 353861, at *7
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (requiring a showing of “‘substantial’ non-internet contacts” in addition to Internet
contacts).
185. See Michael S. Rothman, Comment, It’s A Small World After All: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet
and the Global Marketplace, 23 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 127, 180–81 (1999) (arguing that, as courts
“increasingly find that electronic contacts meet the requirement for minimum contacts[,]” the minimum contacts
test will “rapid[ly] expan[d]”); see also Philip S. Goldberg, Christopher E. Appel, & Victor E. Schwartz, The
U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm Shift to End Litigation Tourism, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 51, 54 (2019) (“As the world grew more interconnected during the latter half of the twentieth
century, particularly with the advent of the Internet, the due process rationale for the minimum contacts standard
started to lose its constitutional grounding. This rationale was no longer sufficiently limiting, as companies were
subject to litigation in a multitude of states.”).
186. “Collectively, the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions are changing the shape of litigation.
New restrictions on jurisdiction make it harder, and in some cases, impossible, for plaintiffs to find available
courts.” Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 501–02
(2018). In fact, “[f]ollowing decades during which the Court decided no cases involving constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction, the Court has reviewed six lower court cases on the exercises of personal jurisdiction since
2011. Each time, the Court found that the lower court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction violated the
Constitution.” Id. at 501. This statement predated, and thus does not account for, the Supreme Court’s most
recent decision in 2021, which was the first in decades to hold that exercising personal jurisdiction in a particular
case was constitutional. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).
187. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
188. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
189. Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 76 (2018).
190. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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close nexus between the forum and the claim.”191 These restrictions offset any
expansion in the virtual contacts context of personal jurisdiction, ensuring that
including virtual contacts in the analysis will not expand the doctrine beyond its
limits.
But even if this approach were characterized as an expansion of the
doctrine, such an expansion is justified. Despite the costs of an expanded
personal jurisdictional reach, including the potential to overload dockets,192
increase forum shopping,193 and result in inconsistent case allocation across
states,194 extending jurisdiction to include virtual contacts comports with
society’s view of fairness in an increasingly interconnected society because
society increasingly views connections as on par with physical connections.195
Further, the rise of virtual contacts increases the risk of harm in forum states and
legitimizes the greater outreach of those states to regulate conduct that causes
that harm, even when the conduct can be done from anywhere.196 Moreover, this
is not a change in doctrine. The change, rather, is in society. In a world
increasingly reliant on virtual activities, virtual interstate contacts rise as
individuals take advantage of the benefits of new technology.197 The tests remain
the same and are merely applied to new types of contacts, which the doctrine
was flexible enough to accommodate from the start.198
This approach—incorporating virtual contacts in the current minimum
contacts test—is promising. From its inception, the minimum contacts test has
embraced flexibility. The test, grounded in meaningful contacts and fairness,
allows for the types of contacts considered to evolve as society advances and as
individuals share meaningful connections across state lines via new modes of
contact. A natural solution therefore is to include these types of contacts in the

191. Dodson, supra note 189, at 83.
192. An expanded personal jurisdictional reach has the potential to further burden court dockets. See Max
D. Lovrin, Note, Virtual Pretrial Jurisdiction for Virtual Contacts, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 943, 944 (2020) (noting
that the “overcomplication [of the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence] often leads to unpredictability, which both
increases expenses for litigants and creates additional work for the already overburdened federal civil docket”).
193. Because of the “discrepancies” amongst state courts, “parties invest serious resources in manipulating
the choice of forum. When the rules ‘are neither clear nor coherent,’ jurisdiction ‘consumes an inordinate
amount’ of time and resources and ‘contributes to the overall inefficiency of the judicial process.’” Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (2014).
194. This inconsistency across states already exists, and adding virtual contacts may exacerbate this
problem. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 325, 327 (2010) (discussing the “lack of uniformity among the federal courts respecting their own
jurisdictional reach”).
195. See infra Part II.B.
196. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
197. Imperatively, while the increase in remote technology is vast, see supra Part I.B., currently, “more than
60 percent of workers in the [U.S.] economy cannot work remotely.” Lund et al., supra note 57. This change in
application of the doctrine, therefore, is not so extensive as to alter the personal jurisdictional inquiry in every
or even most cases.
198. While the Court in International Shoe could not contemplate today’s remote-technology era, it did
reveal a grounding in fairness and a readiness to shift with changes in society. See supra notes 131–35 and
accompanying text; infra Part II.B.
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minimum contacts analysis. This approach accords with existing doctrine and
promotes fairness in a society that increasingly relies on virtual activities.
B. TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
Fairness also supports consideration of virtual contacts in the personal
jurisdiction analysis. Grounded in evolving applications of fairness to an
advancing society, the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
standard can accommodate even today’s monumental changes—from the
exponential increase in the use of remote technology to pandemic and postpandemic shifts in how people in society connect with one another.
1. Current Doctrine and Development
In addition to the minimum contacts test, International Shoe announced the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” standard, which requires
that exercising personal jurisdiction does “not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice’” and acts as a second step following the minimum
contacts analysis.199 The roots of this standard have existed in the personal
jurisdiction analysis from early in its development.200 While the “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice” standard appears with the “minimum
contacts” test, it is a separate analysis that has the potential to drive the
outcome.201
This standard also represented an important shift in the underlying
principles of personal jurisdiction from a territorial approach based on physical
contacts to a fairness approach based on “minimum contacts” and general
notions of fairness.202 The Court in International Shoe delivered this

199. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’”) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In dissent, however,
Justice Black struggled with this “elastic” standard. Id. at 324–25 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I think it a judicial
deprivation to condition its exercise upon this Court’s notion of ‘fairplay,’ however appealing that term may
be.”).
200. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (“Subject to its conception of sovereignty even
the common law required a judgment not to be contrary to natural justice . . . . And in states bound together by
a Constitution and subject to the 14th Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair
play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.”).
201. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1985) (“Nevertheless, minimum
requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.”). This potential, however, may
be minimal. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part) (describing the case as “one of those rare cases” in which the fair play and substantial justice
standard “defeat[s]” the minimum contacts test).
202. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 131, at 355–56 (“Under the forward-looking face of International Shoe, a
litigant’s activity is important for jurisdictional purposes only insofar as it satisfies requisites of a nationalized
solution to administering justice in a federal nation . . . . [T]he touchstone . . . is whether requiring a defendant
to litigate in a state is ‘reasonable in the context of our federal system of government’ in light of the ultimate
goal of ‘the fair and orderly administration of the laws.’”); Barbara Surtees Goto, Note, International Shoe Gets
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“debilitating blow,” favoring a flexible standard that allows courts to exercise
jurisdiction based on notions of fairness and justice rather than a rigid
assessment of physical and geographic location.203 After International Shoe,
physical location and territorial boundaries lost their luster as guiding stars for
assessing personal jurisdiction.204 Now, “two sets of values—treating
defendants fairly and protecting ‘interstate federalism’”205—lead the way.
This shift from Pennoyer v. Neff’s206 territorial approach to International
Shoe’s fairness-based approach developed as a response to a changing national
economy and society in tandem with an increase in interstate travel and
business.207 Indeed, “as the United States became a mobile, industrialized
society, the doctrine of Pennoyer proved to be inadequate and the courts were
forced to deviate from its principles and adjust then to the changing times.”208
the Boot: Burnham v. Superior Court Resurrects the Physical Power Theory, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 851, 856–58
(1991) (discussing the rise of “a more flexible fairness and reasonableness approach” to personal jurisdiction
and the decline of the territorial concept after International Shoe).
203. David G. Thomas, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in the Nebulous Regions of Cyberspace: A Call for the
Continued Relaxation of Due Process and Another Debilitating Blow to Territorial Jurisdiction, 31 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 507, 512–13 (1997) (“Traditional concepts of territorial jurisdiction and federalism seemingly suffered
a debilitating blow in 1945 by the Court’s International Shoe Co. v. Washington decision. Drastically retreating
from views that jurisdictional power stemmed from state sovereignty, the Court forged a balancing test out of
the auspices of the Due Process Clause to ascertain a state’s jurisdictional reach.”).
204. See Kogan, supra note 131, at 262 (“When considered in relation to litigation, a person’s prior choice
to reside in one state rather than another (that is, his physical location at the moment of a lawsuit’s
commencement) can no longer be viewed as an immutable, sacrosanct fact entitled to constitutional protection.
Rather, the physical locations of both the plaintiff and the defendant must now be viewed as societal resources
made possible by the structural nature of our federal system and supported by the federal government. Once we
recognize the federal government’s role in supporting both a litigant’s choice of physical location and
opportunity to participate in multistate transactions, one must accept the possibility of redistributing that societal
resource, given an appropriate justification. International Shoe sets up the parameters for such justifications in
terms of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”).
205. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).
206. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
207. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (“Looking back over this long history
of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years.”); Reynolds, supra note 172, at 824–25 (“American society had moved from
a localized, agrarian society where state lines constituted important social and economic boundaries, to an urban
industrialized society where modes of living and conducting business transcended state boundaries and made
them much less significant. The United States moved inexorably toward social, economic, and political unity.
The legal realist’s social-functional conception of law and legal institutions provided the Court with a theoretical
framework for interpreting and applying constitutional provisions in a way that allowed the social change and
growth that had been inhibited by rigid, conservative formalism. International Shoe . . . w[as] [a] manifestation[]
of the new legal thinking and should be seen in this context.”); Douglas M. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law
of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 755 (2003) (“During those years, both the Supreme Court and
other courts increasingly struggled to apply this seemingly clear test in individual cases for two primary reasons.
First, the test was created at a time in American history when travel from state to state was difficult and
meaningful; in the twentieth century, interstate travel became cheap and common. Second, the test was created
for natural persons, not for fictional entities such as corporations; in the twentieth century, America’s business
was becoming the domain of corporations. A court could rather easily determine when a natural person was
served within state boundaries, but faced difficulties when dealing with a fictional person without a corporeal
body.”).
208. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 1064.
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Even since International Shoe, a “fundamental transformation in the American
economy” has expanded the scope of personal jurisdiction.209 Specifically,
[t]oday many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may
involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing
nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity.210

In 1980, the Supreme Court noted that these advancements “have only
accelerated in the generation since” the Supreme Court first made these
observations.211 The doctrine’s evolution thus tracked society’s changes in
business practices and adoption of technology. Of course, since 1980, an
increase in remote technology has contributed to even more advancements. In
light of the doctrine’s history, personal jurisdiction’s flexible, fairness-based
standard similarly suits today’s evolving technology. Having grown out of a
changing society, this standard is flexible enough to continue to contemplate
change, more technological advancement, and more interstate connection.
The “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” standard
encompasses an advancing society’s technological changes. Importantly, the
“traditional notions” in this standard refer to traditional notions of fairness. In
other words, the notions of fairness must be traditional, not the contacts that
serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction.212 The standard then does not restrict
evolving technology and the new types of conduct and contacts that arise from
it from entering the analysis. Rather, even new technologies and virtual contacts
can implicate these “traditional notions” and beliefs of fairness, justice, and due
process even though the subject matter considered is new.213
Just like the changes that led to International Shoe’s reconsideration of the
doctrine, today’s and tomorrow’s changes warrant consideration within the
traditional doctrines. “If the economy had fundamentally changed between the

209. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
210. McGee, 355 U.S. at 222–23.
211. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
212. See Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional
Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 682 (1991) (criticizing “focusing solely on the
word ‘traditional’” and thereby “ignor[ing] the words that follow” in the “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice standard” and explaining that “[t]he International Shoe Court did not say that due process
dictates adherence to traditional judicial practices of asserting jurisdiction. Rather, it expressly referred to
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ Far from mindlessly equating traditional jurisdictional
practice with due process, the International Shoe Court attempted to introduce into jurisdictional analysis the
traditional due process concern with fundamental procedural fairness”).
213. Justice Gorsuch may disagree with this interpretation of the standard. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1039 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“New technologies and new
schemes to evade the process server will always be with us. But if our concern is with ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice,’ not just our personal and idiosyncratic impressions of those things, perhaps we
will always wind up asking variations of the same questions.”) (citation omitted).
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time of International Shoe and 1980, it has certainly changed between 1980 and
the present day, especially considering the heralding of the information age.”214
As this history shows, “[t]he evolution of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has
historically been closely linked with technology.”215 Specifically, social changes
during the twentieth century altered the national economy, commerce, travel,
and daily life.216 Similarly, now “the advent of information technology in the
late twentieth century”—as well as the even more recent increased use and
reliance on virtual technology in the twenty-first century and post-pandemic
world—“has fundamentally rearranged the economic ordering of society.”217
Courts should consider how these changes impact how the economy functions,
how business is done, and how people connect with one another in the
jurisdictional inquiry. The day-to-day realities that grow out of such changes
should factor into the “fair play and substantial justice” analysis. Indeed,
“[c]onceiving a notion of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ that reconciles with
the pragmatic realities of the cyber world is absolutely vital.”218
2. Application in the Remote-Technology Context
What is fair and just is to find personal jurisdiction in cases with sufficient
virtual contacts. This flexible approach to virtual contacts and remote activities
“further[s] fairness as a matter of due process, respect[s] state sovereignty, and
ensur[es] access to the courts.”219 Indeed, “[t]he concepts of Due Process and
fairness evolve over time in response to social, economic and technological
advancement.”220 Since the Court decided International Shoe, society—in
particular, its use of and reliance on virtual technology—has evolved. Similarly,
what people in society understand to be fair and just has evolved.221 Now, people

214. Bernhardt, supra note 134, at 134 (referencing Justice Brennan’s assertion that “[t]he model of society
on which the International Shoe Court based its opinion is no longer accurate” and arguing that, “[w]ith the
advent of the internet, the changes in the national economy are becoming ever more pressing”) (citing WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
215. Julie Cromer Young, The Online-Contacts Gamble After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 753, 753 (2015).
216. See supra note 207 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds, supra note 172, at 824 (stating that “[i]n
order to fully understand International Shoe, one must consider it in the social, economic, and constitutional
context that produced this radical change in constitutional jurisprudence”).
217. Bernhardt, supra note 134, at 134.
218. Jason Green, Note, Is Zippo’s Sliding Scale a Slippery Slope of Uncertainty? A Case for Abolishing
Web Site Interactivity as a Conclusive Factor in Assessing Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace, 34 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1051, 1074 (2001).
219. Matthew P. Demartini, Comment, Stepping Back to Move Forward: Expanding Personal Jurisdiction
by Reviving Old Practices, 67 EMORY L.J. 809, 839 (2018).
220. Nguyen, supra note 131, at 273.
221. This is true across social issues. For example, society’s view of the fairness of the justice system tends
to shift as its problems surface. See Natalie Anne Knowlton, Expert Opinion: Trusting the Public’s Perception
of Our Justice System, IAALS: BLOG (Aug. 27, 2020), https://iaals.du.edu/blog/expert-opinion-trusting-publics-perception-our-justice-system. In particular, COVID-19 has raised questions about the fairness of “how to
dispense justice.” Id. (“The pandemic has forced difficult conversations about how to serve the public—how to
dispense justice—in an environment that makes the old in-person, on-site model nearly impossible. In a sector
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understand their virtual interactions as defined not by rigid and invisible
territorial boundaries but by the extent of their contact with that state.222
Importantly, it may thus be fair to subject the increasing number of remotetechnology users who engage in interstate activities to the jurisdiction of other
forum states. Accordingly, it is fair and just to consider virtual contacts in the
inquiry.
When courts consider the “fair play and substantial justice” standard, they
consider general notions of fairness—in addition to the specified fairness
factors.223 Fairness requires a consideration of changes in society, including the
new era of conducting business and going about daily life via-à-vis new
technologies. For instance, even though it once might have been, “[g]eography
is not the touchstone of fairness. In an age when business is routinely conducted
by electronic technology, and air travel brings the two national coasts within
hours of each other, state boundaries are less relevant to the determination of
fairness.”224 The rise in remote work and increased reliance on remote
technology then become more relevant to the fairness inquiry. In fact, “the nature
of the employment is highly relevant to the analysis of reasonableness. The
benefits that flow from e-commerce, such as not having to relocate to accept a
position, and the flexibility of work-from-home employment can be tempered
with corresponding obligations to the employer.”225 It is therefore more fair to
consider such virtual contacts and to find jurisdiction in cases with out-of-state
remote-technology users.
Moreover, all this flexible standard requires is consideration of what people
in society already know to be true. For example, in the remote work context,
remote technology enables remote and in-person employees to do the same work
in a substantially similar manner but in different locations.226 With a fairness
analysis that relies less on state boundaries and increasingly on the realities of a
new era’s technological norms, refusing to exercise jurisdiction in the remote
worker’s case but exercising it in the in-person worker’s case does not comport
with society’s view of fairness because both perform the same work for the same
company with many of the same or similar contacts. As the shift to this remotewhere the question ‘is court a place or a service?’ is debated, the pandemic has turned everything on end (and
most likely put the debate around that question to bed).”).
Imperatively, society cares about the fairness of legal processes. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The
Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 137–38 (2011) (“[T]he
empirical evidence suggests that individuals value fairness of process, separate and apart from outcome, because
of the special message that fairness of process sends to its recipients: an authority who acts in a fair manner is
an authority who is legitimate and cares about the dignity and social standing of those who stand before it.”).
222. See sources cited supra note 172.
223. See infra Part II.C.2. for an in-depth discussion of each fairness factor’s application in the remotetechnology context.
224. Green v. William Mason & Co., 996 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D.N.J. 1998).
225. Numeric Analytics, LLC v. McCabe, 161 F. Supp. 3d 348, 356 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
226. See supra Introduction (illustrating the jurisdictional inquiries for a defendant employer sued by two
workers—one remote and one with whom the employer shares more physical contacts—doing substantially
similar work).
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technology era continues, people increasingly view virtual meetings as
tantamount to in-person meetings.227
Despite obvious differences,228 virtual meetings are similar to in-person
meetings in both function and effect.229 With each click on a Zoom link,
individuals increasingly understand these meetings as meaningful
connections.230 Currently, however, technology and virtual contacts do not
inform the personal jurisdiction analysis in the ways that people in society
understand these contacts. People generally understand that their online conduct
can create effects and harms in other states,231 and they may find that it would
be most fair and just for interstate contacts, virtual or not, to give rise to personal
jurisdiction regardless of physical boundaries.232 But these facts currently do not
result in a finding of personal jurisdiction.233 Rather, including new technologies
in the analysis fits better with people’s understanding of connections within their
society as well as their understanding of what is fair and just.
While a flexible—and thus broad—standard may pose challenges,
incorporating these considerations into the personal jurisdiction analysis would
not be unduly burdensome or complicated for courts. In fact, “[t]his process of
judicial evolution would work . . . well for determining the limits of personal
jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.”234 Courts are generally well-equipped
to balance fundamental fairness in light of an evolving society.235 Even as the

227. See, e.g., PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 7 (“In general, teleworkers view video conferencing and
instant messaging platforms as a good substitute for in-person contact—65% feel this way, while 35% say they
are not a good substitute.”).
228. In addition to differences in the mechanics and technology used, virtual meetings present areas for
improvement. See Rosemary Ravinal, Why We Should Stop Pretending Virtual Meetings Are Working—And
How to Fix Them, RAGAN: PR DAILY (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.prdaily.com/why-we-should-stoppretending-virtual-meetings-are-working-and-how-to-fix-them.
229. See DELOITTE, FUTURE OF WORK: WAYS OF WORKING TO SUSTAIN AND THRIVE IN UNCERTAIN TIMES
6–11 (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-future-ofremote-work.pdf (discussing how to successfully transition to remote work).
230. “Teleworkers are taking advantage of online tools and platforms to keep in touch with co-workers, and
most see them as a good substitute.” PARKER ET AL., supra note 53, at 15.
231. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
232. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
233. See supra Part I.C.
234. Daniel Steuer, Comment, The Shoe Fits and the Lighter Is Out of Gas: The Continuing Utility of
International Shoe and the Misuse and Ineffectiveness of Zippo, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 356 (2003).
235. Many important doctrinal tests involve a balancing of interests, including the tiers of scrutiny for
determining equal protection and due process violations, see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), and the test that grew out of this footnote; the three-part balancing test for determining
procedural due process violations, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); and many more.
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classic debate236 over the role of judges rages on,237 in practice, courts are
frequently tasked with applying existing rules to new factual scenarios and do
so without trouble.238 Courts can also apply traditional personal jurisdiction
doctrines to new aspects of an advancing society.239 The Supreme Court itself
has indicated that the “fair play and substantial justice” analysis “necessarily
requires determinations ‘in which few answers will be written in black and
white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable.’”240 The “fair play and substantial justice” standard fits this type
of analysis particularly well, as it asks courts to consider whether it would be
fair to exercise jurisdiction over a particular out-of-state defendant, while
furthering important interests in due process and fairness. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has already indicated that this task is not too strenuous for courts,
stating that “the fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily applied in
the vast majority of cases.”241
Some commentators argue that broad standards, while allowing for
judgments based on fairness and justice, also result in “constant litigation and
236. Compare Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989)
(“All I urge is that [totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis] be avoided where
possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows; and that,
to foster a correct attitude toward the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally reached
the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of the circumstances, we are acting more as
factfinders than as expositors of the law.”), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
847 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution instead
depends on the hard task of judging—sifting through the details and determining whether the challenged
program offends the [Constitution]. Such judgment requires courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on
the particular facts of each case.”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court Term 1991—Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 27 (1992) (“The Justices of rules are skeptical about
reasoned elaboration and suspect that standards will enable the Court to translate raw subjective value
preferences into law. The Justices of standards are skeptical about the capacity of rules to constrain value choice
and believe that custom and shared understandings can adequately constrain judicial deliberation in a regime of
standards.”).
237. See Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, 46 TULSA L.
REV. 431, 433, 441 (2011) (illustrating “an important and perhaps under-appreciated characteristic of Chief
Justice Roberts’ legal philosophy: his apparent commitment to rules rather than standards” and finding that the
Chief Justice “has generally supported the use of rules on the basis that they constrain judicial discretion and
power”); see also “I Come Before the Committee With No Agenda. I Have No Platform.,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/i-come-before-the-committee-with-noagenda-i-have.html (reporting Chief Justice Roberts’ opening statements in his confirmation hearing, including
his famous description of his judicial philosophy: “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is
a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire.”).
238. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114–16 (1987) (balancing
the fairness factors to determine the Court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant
manufacturer). Despite the unanimous ruling in Asahi, however, the Court was split regarding the proper
analysis. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 121 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
239. See Steuer, supra note 234, at 356 (noting that applying traditional doctrines to new aspects of an
advancing society is “what courts have always done”).
240. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 486 n.29 (1985) (citing Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
241. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
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seemingly endless reformulations of the minimum contacts test.”242 This
uncertainty and unpredictability may lead, it is argued, to “chilling effects.”243
However, “[t]he Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of
the laws,’ . . . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”244
The requirement of minimum contacts in conjunction with the “fair play and
substantial justice” standard therefore prevents an overly permissive standard
and a dramatic reformulation of the doctrine.245 Rather, this standard merely
accommodates developments in how people in society connect with one another
in such a way that would make it fair to subject them to personal jurisdiction.
Moreover, an overly simplistic rule in place of this broad standard may eliminate
important fairness considerations altogether. “[W]hen the existence of
jurisdiction in a particular forum under International Shoe is unclear, the cost of
simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the
sacrifice of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ That cost is too high.”246
State sovereignty also still receives its due respect247 under this approach
because allowing virtual contacts into the analysis merely adds new
considerations rather than a guarantee of a particular result. In other words,
considering virtual contacts and the fairness of subjecting out-of-state remotetechnology users to jurisdiction does not require a finding of personal
jurisdiction and an exercise of sovereign authority that would conflict with
notions of interstate federalism. Rather, it merely allows courts to subject these
defendants to jurisdiction only when it would be fair and just to do so based on
their connection with the forum state and that state’s sovereign interests.248
242. Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreword, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 529 (1995) (“There are virtues in
vagueness and uncertainty—they do allow courts to make individual judgments of what is fair and just and
reasonable in ways that bright lines do not. But is the cost of constant litigation and seemingly endless
reformulations of the minimum contacts test worth the price? The Symposium’s collective judgment is ‘no.’”).
243. Exon, supra note 14, at 48 (“If we continue applying the contemporary notions of personal jurisdiction
to Internet activities, the result could be catastrophic, and have chilling effects on everyone.”).
244. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
245. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (requiring both “minimum contacts” and a finding that exercising
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” to comply with due process)
(citation omitted).
246. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211.
247. Commentators disagree about the extent to which the personal jurisdiction inquiry should consider state
sovereignty. Compare Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 730 (2012) (arguing that state sovereignty
considerations add little to the personal jurisdiction analysis), with Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State
Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2016) (arguing that “state
sovereignty should be seen as a basic theoretical justification for the constitutional restrictions on personal
jurisdiction”).
248. Even with these considerations, interstate federalism is protected:
[A]t times, this federalism interest may be decisive. As we explained in World-Wide
Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
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Moreover, even though the prevalence of virtual contacts may mean that
the personal jurisdiction doctrine will expand,249 applying the traditional
doctrines is consistent with state sovereignty because forum states must have a
way to protect themselves and their citizens from virtual conduct that causes real
harm. In fact, “[t]he law of specific jurisdiction . . . seeks to ensure that States
with ‘little legitimate interest’ in a suit do not encroach on States more affected
by the controversy.”250 These “restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’”251
This power includes “the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.”252
Further, when “States have significant interests at stake—‘providing [their]
residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state
actors,’ as well as enforcing their own safety regulations[]”253—“principles of
‘interstate federalism’ support jurisdiction . . . .”254 Accordingly, this approach’s
consideration of the forum state’s interest in protecting itself from harms aligns
with state sovereignty interests.
Including virtual contacts in the personal jurisdiction analysis resolves the
problems of plaintiffs losing access to particular courts and forums losing the
ability to redress harms based on an out-of-state defendant’s use of technology.
As opposed to an arbitrary result based on the defendant’s location and use of
virtual rather than physical contacts,255 this approach allows plaintiffs to hale
into court out-of-state defendants who caused harm through contacts with the
forum state. Forum states can exercise jurisdiction over such defendants. Doing

applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes
act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294) (second alteration in original).
249. See supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text.
250. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (citing Bristol-Myers
Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780).
251. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
252. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293). This power of each state “implie[s] a limitation
on the sovereignty of all its sister States.” Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293) (alteration in
original).
253. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030 (2021) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985))
(first alteration in original).
254. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293).
255. See supra Introduction (illustrating a remote worker’s potential inability to sue his out-of-state
employer in his forum state).
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so has been valid,256 and doing so respects state sovereignty.257 Injecting fairness
into this analysis supports state sovereignty by allowing particular courts to
assert their sovereign authority to redress harm that occurs within the state’s
boundaries. This exercise of authority results in increased access to particular
courts and to particular out-of-state defendants and thus increased access to
justice.258
Even though this approach posits a broad standard as the foundation for
personal jurisdiction, this standard is core to personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
and due process. It encompasses important traditional and constitutional
principles that underlie and justify the doctrine. With roots in societal change,
International Shoe’s “fair play and substantial justice” standard suits
contemporary technological changes. What better standard is there on which to
base personal jurisdiction—a doctrine with the power to open and close
courthouse doors—than fairness and justice?
C. THE FAIRNESS FACTORS
As extrapolations of the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” standard, the fairness factors accommodate remote activities and, in
some cases, weigh towards finding personal jurisdiction. Despite their absence
in much of the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the fairness factors inject a
practical weighing of important interests of and burdens on the parties and
institutions involved. As the reliance on virtual contacts becomes more
widespread, the fairness factors provide an effective framework and often tip the
scale towards finding personal jurisdiction.
1. Current Doctrine and Development
The fairness factors include: “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining

256. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also John N. Drobak, The Federalism
Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1983) (“By judging the adequacy of the contacts
with a standard of fairness, International Shoe tied the federalism and individual rights branches of personal
jurisdiction together. This express joinder of the two branches showed that it is unnecessary to consider
federalism in deciding jurisdictional issues. A defendant has a right to be free from a court’s authority unless
there exist minimum contacts with the forum state. If there are sufficient contacts, judged by a standard of
fairness to the defendant, the concern for federalism is satisfied.”).
257. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (“[The personal jurisdiction] rules derive from and reflect two sets of
values—treating defendants fairly and protecting ‘interstate federalism.’ Our decision in International Shoe
founded specific jurisdiction on an idea of reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only when)
a [defendant] ‘exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state’—thus ‘enjoy[ing] the benefits and
protection of [its] laws’—the State may hold the company to account for related misconduct.”) (citations
omitted); Drobak, supra note 256, at 1039.
258. Note, however, that a finding of no personal jurisdiction does not close all courthouse doors and thus
does not cut off access to justice completely. Generally, the door that closes is the door to the courthouse in the
forum in which the plaintiff resides. In most cases, the door to the courthouse in the defendant’s home state will
still be available. For more detailed discussion on the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief,
including access to a convenient court, see infra Part II.C.2.c.
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convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’ and ‘the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’”259
These factors typically enter the analysis once minimum contacts have been
established, and they expand on the “fair play and substantial justice”
standard.260 As an expansion of the “fair play and substantial justice” standard,
the fairness factors may also “defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction,” even if
minimum contacts exist.261 Indeed, “although a finding of minimum contacts
establishes a presumption of reasonableness, the constitutional inquiry does not
end with a conclusion that there are minimum contacts between the defendant
and the state forum.”262
Essentially, “jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to
make litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at
a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.”263 By focusing on the
realities of the burdens and interests of the parties involved, the fairness factors
inject practicality into the personal jurisdiction analysis, in effect asking: is this
a fair forum for this dispute?
Despite their positives, “[t]he fairness factors have done very little work in
the Supreme Court’s actual decisions.”264 This may be because, “if the defendant
has satisfied the minimum contacts prong, then a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction will be fundamentally fair.”265 Therefore, in its recent personal
jurisdiction cases, the Court has infrequently explicitly conducted what may be
a fairly obvious fairness analysis.266 However, by not mentioning this analysis
or explaining its absence in these opinions, “these opinions leave the vitality of
the fairness factors in doubt.”267 After all, this absence may also derive from the

259. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 292).
260. See id. at 476 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320) (“Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and
substantial justice.’”).
261. Id. at 477–78 (“Nevertheless, minimum requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and
substantial justice’ may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged
in forum activities.”). However, courts rarely rest their analysis on the fairness factors. See Howard B.
Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 755 (2012) (stating that it is
“exceedingly rare” for courts to find that the fairness factors “over[i]de a positive finding of minimum contacts”).
The Supreme Court has expressed its hesitancy to rest the jurisdictional inquiry on fairness. See, e.g., J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (“[J]urisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority
rather than fairness.”).
262. Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the
Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 445–46 (1991).
263. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) and
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 2223 (1957)).
264. Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1138.
265. Id.
266. But see Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987).
267. Stravitz, supra note 261, at 755 n.77.
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Court’s preference for federalist, rather than fairness, concerns.268 Regardless of
this doubt, the fairness factors remain an effective framework for assessing the
fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction.
2. Application in the Remote-Technology Context
Courts can incorporate remote activities in the personal jurisdiction inquiry
by revivifying the fairness factors analysis. Indeed, despite their absence in
recent opinions, the fairness factors “have been long identified as critical to the
personal jurisdiction analysis.”269 With remote activities, which may increase
the overall number of contacts an out-of-state defendant has with the forum
state,270 “the fairness factors have an increased role in ensuring the requirements
of due process.”271 Each of the fairness factors can accommodate the increased
reliance on remote technology and together will often weigh towards finding
personal jurisdiction.
a. The Burden on the Defendant
Widespread reliance on remote technology may lessen the burdens on outof-state defendants, lightening the weight of the fairness factors and shifting the
scale towards finding personal jurisdiction in virtual contacts cases. Because the
burden on the defendant is “always a primary concern,”272 lessening this burden
with remote technology has a strong impact on the overall fairness calculus.

268. The Court has vacillated between justifying its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence with concerns over
state sovereignty and federalism on the one hand and fairness and justice on the other. Compare J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed
at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the
power to subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”), with Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects
an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty.”). In recent years, the Court has hewed towards the federalist theme. See BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (noting that “restrictions on personal
jurisdiction ‘are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’ ‘[T]he States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The
sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States’”) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted). However, even more recently, the Court has indicated that both fairness and
federalism have a place in the personal jurisdiction analysis. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (“These rules derive from and reflect two sets of values—treating defendants fairly
and protecting ‘interstate federalism.’”) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980)).
269. Niesel, supra note 142, at 142.
270. See supra Part II.A.2.
271. Niesel, supra note 142, at 142.
272. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The Ninth Circuit explained why this factor is of such
concern. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (“If the burdens of
trial are too great for a plaintiff, the plaintiff can decide not to sue or, perhaps, to sue elsewhere. A defendant has
no such luxury.”).
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Remote technology makes it so that defendants can more easily engage in
activities in other states across the nation. It may then be less convenient for
defendants to travel from those faraway places to defend the suit in the forum
state.273 However, while out-of-state defendants may have farther to travel
should their remote activities give rise to a cause of action in a faraway forum,
remote technology also makes it easier for these defendants to defend these
suits.274 The Supreme Court in 1958 even noted the alleviating effect of
technology on the out-of-state defendant’s burden.275 Like the “progress in
communications and transportation”276 in 1958, the use of email, telephone, and
video calls in 2022 enables defendants to defend suits with relative ease and
efficiency. For example, out-of-state defendants can work with counsel in the
forum state via videoconference, even from their faraway location.277 The
necessity of using these remote-technology tools to conduct client meetings and
internal strategy sessions during the pandemic has shown that “the technology
works, and the meetings can go on, often more easily arranged and less costly
than before.”278 While these defendants may still need to appear in court in the
forum state,279 these appearances may be limited in number and structured to
273. See Niesel, supra note 142, at 142 (arguing that “convenience to the defendant should serve as a check
against possible jurisdictional abuse”). One court identified a burden on the out-of-state defendant due to “the
growing concerns surrounding COVID-19 and the national emergency declared due to its continued spread.”
Bride Ministries, NFP v. DeMaster, No. 4:20-CV-00402, 2020 WL 6822836, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2020).
However, the COVID-19 pandemic has also revealed possibilities for lessening these burdens through the use
of remote technology. See infra notes 274–81 and accompanying text. These specific concerns will also dissipate
in the post-pandemic world.
274. See Scott Dodson, Lee H. Rosenthal & Christopher L. Dodson, The Zooming of Federal Civil
Litigation, 104 JUDICATURE 13, 18 (2020) (“Videoconferencing may not address all of the convenience
considerations at stake in these determinations, but it should lessen the weight of those that are based on the
difficulties and costs of traveling to one or the other location.”).
275. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (“As technological progress has increased the
flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.
At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign
tribunal less burdensome.”).
276. Id.
277. “We have learned that we no longer need hordes of attorneys, clients, experts, paralegals, and others—
perhaps from distant time zones—to cram into a conference room in a downtown skyscraper for every
brainstorming, drafting, and strategy session.” Dodson et al., supra note 274, at 14.
278. Id. This ease may continue post-pandemic. See Marilyn Kunstler & Julia Brickell, Complex Litigation
Just Got More Complex: Adapting to a Virtual New Reality, LAW.COM: N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 7, 2020, 10:22 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/10/07/complex-litigation-just-got-more-complex-adapting-toa-virtual-reality (“The pandemic has been deeply disruptive, initiating the need to rethink and re-imagine the
management of complex litigation. The crisis has forced a dramatic acceleration in the adoption of technological
innovations by law firms and the courts, and increased demand may spur further innovation. Forward-thinking
counsel, working to mitigate the disruption at multiple levels, will do well to address and enhance workflows,
technology skill, and human impacts of the pandemic in adapting to this new reality while recognizing the
opportunities it presents.”).
279. Despite remote technology’s benefits, in-person events may better suit some phases of the litigation:
[T]he efficiency gains and cost savings of videoconferencing are likely to prevail routinely for
internal meetings, witness interviews, court conferences, simple oral arguments, and uncontentious
depositions, especially when travel is required. By contrast, when justice strongly favors in-person
events, such as for contentious depositions, complex motion hearings, and trials, or when
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accommodate the defendant’s travel needs. Moreover, with even a portion of the
meetings and phases of litigation before trial conducted via remote
technology,280 the overall burdens of litigating in a faraway forum are
significantly minimized. Indeed, “given the advances in technology, it is not
clear that the burden of litigating is so great as to violate due process.”281 This
inquiry will be case-specific based on individual defendants’ burdens, but,
overall, remote technology reduces these burdens on out-of-state defendants.
Remote technology not only allows an out-of-state defendant to more
easily defend a suit in another state, but it also allows the out-of-state defendant
to either avoid faraway forums or to attain so many benefits that they outweigh
the costs of defending a suit in a faraway forum. It may be true that “societal
interests are best served when we require defendants to defend suits in a
particular forum only in those instances where the benefits accruing to the
defendant from his activity there exceed the costs of forcing him to defend in
that forum.”282 With remote activities, however, the benefits the out-of-state
defendant obtains will more often outweigh the costs of defending in the forum
state. After all, “[i]t is the defendant that has reached out through what it knows
to be a globally accessible technology, and it is the defendant who may choose
to stop doing so if it does not want to take on the risk of litigation or to customize
its online operations to avoid the target forum.”283 With the “fair warning” that
“a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign,”284 the defendant can then “‘structure [its] primary conduct’ to lessen
or avoid exposure to a given State’s courts.”285 Accordingly, the use of remote
technology lessens the out-of-state defendant’s burdens.
b. The Forum State’s Interest in Adjudicating the Dispute
The forum state has an increased interest in adjudicating the dispute
because the forum has an interest in redressing harms that occur within its
borders, regardless of its virtual source. “[O]ne of the most important factors,”286
the forum’s interest weighs towards finding personal jurisdiction on even surer
videoconferencing presents its own costs and difficulties, such as for document-intensive
proceedings, we think the balance will often—though not always—weigh against videoconferencing.
Dodson et al., supra note 274, at 13–14.
280. See id. at 13.
281. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Grp. Tech. Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 649, 676 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
282. Burk, supra note 133, at 1119.
283. Niesel, supra note 142, at 142.
284. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (alteration in original)
(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
285. Id. (alteration in original) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
286. Abramson, supra note 262, at 451. In fact, “[a] court’s disposition of this factor is generally consistent
with the ultimate disposition of the reasonableness equation.” Id. at 451–52. Further, “[w]hen minimum contacts
have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify
even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
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footing when virtual harms are involved. As remote technology becomes more
widespread and as users increasingly engage in activities that give rise to causes
of action in other states, consideration of the forum’s interest in protecting its
residents and its ability to reach faraway defendants becomes heightened.
When harms occur in a state, that state has an interest in redressing those
harms.287 This remains true with the out-of-state defendant remote-technology
user, where that user contacted the forum state and that contact was sufficient.
In those cases, forums have an interest in protecting individuals within their
borders, no matter whether the harm occurred through virtual or physical
contacts.288 Where a forum’s residents suffer harm within the forum, “[i]t cannot
be denied that [the forum] has a manifest interest in providing effective means
of redress for its residents . . . .”289
Even where the in-state plaintiff was a “successful, sophisticated
corporation,” a court found that refusing to subject the out-of-state defendant to
its jurisdiction “in a forum it has so thoroughly exploited would create
significant barriers to effective relief for similarly situated plaintiffs with more
limited resources.”290 Accordingly, the extent to which the out-of-state remotetechnology user “exploited” the forum state increases the forum state’s interest
in adjudicating the dispute. Further, with an out-of-state defendant that had
“hundreds of thousands” of online customers, “[t]here is no unfairness in
requiring [the defendant] to defend that lawsuit in the courts of the state where,
through the very activity giving rise to the suit, it continues to gain so much.”291
Remote technology not only makes it easier for out-of-state defendants to reach
and harm faraway plaintiffs, but these defendants can harm many faraway
plaintiffs with considerable ease. Therefore, forums have an increased interest
in redressing the harms that occur within them and in adjudicating the disputes
that arise because of these harms when the harms come from out-of-state remotetechnology users.

287. See Abramson, supra note 262, at 452 (“The most frequent judicially invoked basis for this interest is
that of providing a forum for its own citizens, individual or corporate, who may have suffered some injury within
the state, especially by nonresident defendants’ acts.”).
288. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998), holding modified
by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that
“California maintains a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress for its residents tortiously
injured . . . ” through virtual conduct); Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *12
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016) (similar); Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero L. Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 608 (9th
Cir. 2018) (similar); Ouellette v. True Penny People, LLC, 352 F. Supp. 3d 144, 155 (D. Mass. 2018) (similar);
M3 USA Corp. v. Hart, 516 F. Supp. 3d 476, 500 (E.D. Penn. 2021) (similar); MaxLite, Inc. v. ATG Elecs., Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 3d 371, 392 (D. N.J. 2016) (similar); WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Grp. Tech. Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 649,
677 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (similar).
289. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
290. uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 432 (7th Cir. 2010).
291. Id. at 432–33.
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c. The Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining Convenient and Effective
Relief
The plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief
increases as out-of-state defendant remote-technology users increasingly cause
harm from faraway forums. While the ability to conduct some phases of
litigation via remote technology reduces the plaintiff’s interest in relief in her
forum state, courts may still conclude that “the plaintiff’s interest favors
maintaining the lawsuit where it was filed.”292
This factor contemplates the difficulty an individual plaintiff may have in
bringing a suit in a faraway forum.293 Refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
over faraway defendants may be so cost prohibitive to some plaintiffs that they
do not bring their cases. “A defendant effectively becomes judgment proof when
individuals with small claims cannot afford the cost of bringing an action in an
inconvenient forum.”294 However, remote technology can alleviate these costs.
Just as the burdens on out-of-state defendants lessen with the use of remote
technology,295 the burdens on plaintiffs to bring a suit in a faraway forum also
lessen. The use of videoconferencing for plaintiffs generally is just as efficient
and cost-saving as videoconferencing for defendants. Further, “a ready and
convenient alternative forum can weigh against jurisdiction in the fairness
calculation.”296 An available out-of-state defendant’s forum, in combination
with the reduced burdens on the plaintiff’s ability to bring suit even in a faraway
forum, may thus undermine a plaintiff’s interest in effective relief in her forum
state.297
However, plaintiffs’ interests in convenient and effective relief may
become increasingly relevant as their choice of forum is between their home
state—the location of their harm, evidence, and residence—and a faraway forum
that may seem arbitrary.298 Plaintiffs have a particular interest in effective relief
in their state when they suffered the injury in that state or when their witnesses
are also located in that state.299 A court found that plaintiffs “undoubtedly” had
292. Abramson, supra note 262, at 455–56.
293. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (finding that petitioner “would be at a severe disadvantage if [she] were
forced to follow [respondent] to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable”).
294. Abramson, supra note 262, at 457.
295. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
296. Richman, supra note 134, at 631; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (finding that “[cross-complainant] has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it
to litigate its indemnification claim against [cross-defendant] in California rather than in Taiwan or Japan”).
297. A court may assess the plaintiff’s interest by comparing it to other available forums:
If the court finds that the plaintiff’s interest is not strong, the court may rule either that the plaintiff
has shown little added convenience to herself by litigating in the forum, or that she has not
demonstrated that pursuing the claim elsewhere would be less expedient than the forum of
choice. The court simply may conclude that the plaintiff could litigate the claim as easily and
effectively in another forum.
Abramson, supra note 262, at 458–59.
298. “[T]he convenience of the plaintiff should be fully considered.” Niesel, supra note 142, at 142.
299. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Abramson, supra note 262, at 458.
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interests in obtaining convenient and effective relief in their forum state because
“[a]ll relevant documents and information are physically stored in [their forum
state]. Presumably most, if not all, witnesses for Plaintiffs will be in [their forum
state]. These facts strongly indicate that the Plaintiffs have an interest in
litigating the case within [their forum state].”300 While some of these interests
may be accommodated through remote meetings and hearings,301 plaintiffs
subject to virtual harms may have no relation to their alternative forum option
other than the fortuity of the defendant’s physical location in that forum despite
the defendant’s virtual contacts and virtual harm. This analysis often comes out
as follows:
It will be far easier for Plaintiff, an individual, to litigate this matter in . . . the
forum state in which she resides. Conversely, a greater burden would be
placed on her if she was forced to litigate her claims in another state. This
factor, although given little weight, tilts in Plaintiff’s favor.302

Overall, this analysis tends to tilt towards the plaintiff only slightly,303 and the
burdens on the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief because of a
faraway defendant may also lessen with remote technology. A court, however,
may still find that this factor contributes to a finding of personal jurisdiction,
even if it is not the factor that ultimately tips the scale.
d. The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest in Obtaining the Most
Efficient Resolution of Controversies
The judicial system also has an interest in efficiently resolving the
controversy. While other forums, such as the out-of-state defendant’s forum
state, could resolve virtual contacts controversies with similar efficiency, the
most efficient forum may still be where the harm occurred. However, remote
technology presents the possibility that a variety of forums can efficiently
resolve virtual contacts controversies.
While this factor is seldom discussed,304 it includes, similar to other factors,
consideration of “(1) the preference for the forum where the injury occurred
and/or where the witnesses reside, (2) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and
(3) the role of choice of law principles.”305 The judicial system’s interest in
resolution goes, in part, beyond particular location by considering what is
300. Bride Ministries, NFP v. DeMaster, No. 4:20-CV-00402, 2020 WL 6822836, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
20, 2020).
301. See Dodson et al., supra note 274, at 14.
302. Alexis v. Rogers, No. 15cv691-CAB-BLM, 2016 WL 11707630, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016).
303. See, e.g., id.; Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero L. Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“This factor weighs slightly in favor of Plaintiffs, but we generally do not give it much weight.”). But see
Abramson, supra note 262, at 455 (“Generally, a court’s finding on this factor seems to weigh heavily in the
balancing suggested by the Supreme Court. Indeed, it is unusual for a judicial finding on this factor to be at
variance with the court’s conclusions after balancing all the factors.”).
304. See Richman, supra note 134, at 632 (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have said much
about this fairness factor.”).
305. Abramson, supra note 262, at 461.
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efficient. The most efficient forum will often be where the out-of-state
defendant’s contacts reached or the harm occurred because this forum often will
be the plaintiff’s home and the location of evidence of and witnesses to the
harm.306 With virtual harms, this analysis may hold because the forum state
remains the home of these important components of the dispute. Several courts
considering virtual harms noted that the “location of the evidence and witnesses”
is the focus of this factor.307 However, these courts also found that “[t]his factor
is neutral especially given the advances of modern technology.”308 With the
increased efficiency of remote technology and the decreased burdens of
litigating in faraway forums,309 the defendant’s forum may also accomplish the
system’s interest. The defendant’s forum is increasingly available due to the
deployment of remote technology.310 The use of remote technology by faraway
litigants throughout the litigation may then satisfy the judicial system’s interest
in effectively resolving any controversy across state lines.
However, if the litigation is particularly complex, as it might be in the
virtual contacts context,311 a court may find that the judicial system’s interest in
efficiently resolving such a complex controversy militates finding personal
jurisdiction in a particular forum.312 Choice of law considerations may also yield
a more efficient result, such as adjudicating the case in the same forum as the
applicable substantive law.313 Ultimately, this analysis will depend on the
specifics of the case at hand, but the increased efficiency of remote technology

306. See id.
307. See, e.g., WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Grp. Tech. Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 649, 677 (N.D. Cal. 2020);
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); Freestream Aircraft, 905 F.3d at
609.
308. WhatsApp, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 3d at 677; see also Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1323 (“It is no longer
weighed heavily given the modern advances in communication and transportation.”); Freestream Aircraft, 905
F.3d at 609 (same).
309. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
310. See Dodson et al., supra note 274, at 14.
311. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 175 at 106–07 (“As the number of transnational cases have grown, so too
have their complexity. From intricate securities and derivatives regulation to transnational class actions, courts
struggle not only applying adjudicatory jurisdiction principles—themselves often convoluted—but also to
understand the factual circumstances from which the cases arise. A number of unresolved doctrinal questions and
thorny conceptual and technical issues (e.g., how to treat the internet and cyberspace in a territorial-based
system) also have led to confusion and a degree of uncertainty.”).
312. See Abramson, supra note 262, at 463 (“[A] single adjudication of legal issues pertaining to the same
series of events generally serves the ‘efficient resolution’ of controversies.”); Richman, supra note 134, at 633
(“The interstate judicial system benefits if all parties and issues are joined in one suit, because repetitious,
piecemeal litigation and inconsistent results are avoided.”). The Supreme Court has found the efficiency of
consolidated litigation persuasive in the fairness analysis. See Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777–
78 (1984) (finding that “the combination of [the forum]’s interest in redressing injuries that occur within the
State and its interest in cooperating with other States in the application of the ‘single publication rule’
demonstrate the propriety of requiring respondent to answer to a multistate libel action in [the forum]”).
313. See Abramson, supra note 262, at 464 (“If the court determines that the forum state’s substantive law
applies to the case, then efficiency is served by proceeding in that forum.”).
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may lead to a finding that jurisdiction would be efficient in a variety of possible
forums.
e. The Shared Interest of the Several States in Furthering
Fundamental Substantive Social Policies
Allowing plaintiffs to bring cases in forums that comport with society’s
understanding of a fair forum may advance social policies. “On a case-by-case
basis, a court is to examine the substantive policies of other states or nations
whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the forum
state.”314 This analysis may well include promoting fairness and state
sovereignty.
This factor has also not received much attention from courts.315 Without
much guidance, lower courts have often conflated this factor with the other
factors.316 For example, courts found that this interest involves “provid[ing] a
convenient forum for its residents to redress injuries inflicted by out-of-state
actors,”317 “protecting residents of its state against tortious conduct,”318
“ensuring that its citizens achieve fair and even-handed trials,”319 and “ensuring
that its citizens are afforded timely and effective relief.”320 Along these lines,
much of the analysis remains the same as the above factors.
One commentator has suggested that different, specific policies should
drive this analysis. These policies are that
(1) another state has no greater interest than the forum in resolving disputes
involving harm to the forum’s residents, (2) there is no serious conflict with
another state’s sovereignty even though the subject of the dispute is or can be
governed by the law of the other state, or (3) the interest of the several states
is best served by resolving claims against all defendants in one forum.321

These considerations involve case-by-case assessments, but broadly, they
incorporate concern for state sovereignty and interstate federalism. Though it
was not expressly discussing this fairness factor, the Supreme Court has
indicated that its personal jurisdiction rules “reflect two sets of values—treating
defendants fairly and protecting ‘interstate federalism[,]’”322 and that “[t]he law
314. Id. at 465.
315. “Few courts attempt to articulate this ‘fair play’ aspect of the due process test for personal jurisdiction,
instead omitting any reference to this factor.” Id.
316. See id. at 468. (“As interpreted by many courts, the ‘shared interest’ factor repeats the forum state’s
interest or efficient resolution rationale with no apparent reference to the substantive social policies furthered by
the states’ shared interest, . . . .”).
317. King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2019).
318. Christie v. Nat’l Inst. for Newman Studs., 258 F. Supp. 3d 494, 509 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing Formula One
Licensing BV v. Valentine, No. CV 14-5812 (JBS/AMD), 2016 WL 7175591 at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016)).
319. Bride Ministries, NFP v. DeMaster, No. 4:20-CV-00402, 2020 WL 6822836, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
20, 2020).
320. Id.
321. Abramson, supra note 262, at 468. Yet, even these policies contain similar considerations as those in
other factors. See supra Parts II.C.2.b. and d.
322. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021).
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of specific jurisdiction . . . seeks to ensure that States with ‘little legitimate
interest’ in a suit do not encroach on States more affected by the controversy.”323
Concerns about state sovereignty and comparison between forums to determine
which has the stronger claim for asserting authority, therefore, do have a place
in assessing the fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction, whether courts
expressly analyze these issues under this factor or not.
Further, some courts “have attempted to define the scope of the ‘shared
interest’ in the context of specific cases.”324 In that vein, social policy may
include consideration of general notions of fairness in an evolving society. As
the use of remote technology increases, individuals understand that remote
activities may give rise to harms in other states and that they may need to defend
these harms where they occur.325 Even if individuals do not understand this logic
or foresee the issues it may raise, the states together have an interest in making
it so that, in at least some instances, courts can exercise jurisdiction over out-ofstate defendant remote-technology users who cause harm there.326 Exercising
jurisdiction over these defendants would promote fairness, support interstate
federalism, and further social policy.
***
This approach proposes revivifying a lesser-used doctrine in the personal
jurisdiction inquiry. The fairness factors accommodate important practical
considerations along with the interests and burdens of the particular parties
involved, which courts may find compelling. On a question that impacts access
to justice and fairness to litigants, it makes sense to consider the individualized
implications for the parties, the forum, and the justice system.
CONCLUSION
Technology is rapidly changing and, so far in the personal jurisdiction
context, the application of law is not changing with it. It may be true that the
Supreme Court is simply not up to the task of updating doctrines in light of
evolving technology. However, embarking into the virtual world and assessing
its legal implications is no longer the mystifying journey into the unknown it
once was. Lower courts have had a chance to work through the issues of virtual
contacts, try out their own solutions, and observe the resulting complications.
As this Note begins to show, remote work is gaining societal acceptance, and
virtual connections are beginning to replace some in-person events. With the
vast increase in use and ubiquity of remote technology now and in the postpandemic world, it is well past time to settle on a doctrinal approach. As some
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
Abramson, supra note 262, at 467.
See supra Part II.A.2.d.
See supra Part II.C.2.b.
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Justices show interest in the vexing Internet-jurisdiction question and as some
begin to rethink International Shoe’s wisdom, this Note offers a familiar answer:
rather than abandon International Shoe, return to it, with a better appreciation
for virtual contacts.
This Note argues that virtual contacts fit in the personal jurisdiction
analysis through its traditional doctrines, applying familiar tools to the newest
iteration of the problem of virtual contacts. Any of the approaches individually
or in combination suffice as the definitive answer to how technological
advancements fit into the personal jurisdiction inquiry. First, this Note proposed
that virtual contacts fit within the minimum contacts calculus because they serve
as constitutionally sufficient connections between the defendant and the forum
state. Second, the “fair play and substantial justice” standard can encompass
technological advancements and societal trends, incorporating an increasingly
interconnected society’s ideas of fairness and justice into the personal
jurisdiction analysis. Third, the fairness factors provide an effective framework
to assess the fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction. In particular, the
decreased burdens on defendant remote-technology users, the forum’s increased
interest in adjudicating a dispute between an out-of-state defendant and an instate victim, the increased interest of plaintiffs in attaining convenient and
effective relief from a faraway defendant, and society’s interest in furthering
fundamental social policies, such as fairness of available forums and concerns
over state sovereignty, will often shift the fairness factors towards a finding of
personal jurisdiction.
Fitting new problems into traditional tests—and, by so doing, maintaining
a coherent doctrine—is the preferable option to formulating a new test that
attempts to address technology that will inevitably continue to evolve. After all,
personal jurisdiction’s case-by-case analysis and broad tests can, and should,
accommodate new circumstances and an evolving society. New technology and
a new global event add what seem like intractable complications but are simply
one more shift in the nation’s economic and day-to-day functions that current
personal jurisdiction doctrines are well-equipped to handle. As the Internetjurisdiction question becomes more pressing in the post-pandemic world and
beyond, personal jurisdiction’s traditional tests remain the best path forward.
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